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Introduction
In the Sahara…they have a saying which goes, “No one lives in the Sahara if he is able to live
elsewhere…”
-Paul Bowles

Hajj Ahmed was the secretary for a men’s association in the village of L’Kasbat Sidi
Abdullah Ben M’barek. 1 L’Kasbat is located in the desert province of Tata along Morocco’s
southern frontier with Algeria. From June of 2000 until the end of 2002, I served as a Peace
Corps volunteer in L’Kasbat and Ahmed initially befriended me because he thought I might have
access to resources that could assist him and his association with some of their many village
improvement projects. Because the residents of L’Kasbat live a precarious existence, the
association was established to organize village resources in hopes that through collectivity they
might be able to solve some of the village’s problems. Water and land are extremely scarce
resources and the village is entirely dependent on male migrants who travel north to find work
and send remittances home. 2 Ahmed’s biggest dream was to one day be able to reclaim some of
the land lost to the desert and establish a village farming cooperative in order to sell fruits and
vegetables at the bi-weekly souk and produce enough grain so that the village could be selfsufficient in that regard. Although I was supportive of his vision, I did not view the landscape of
his village from the same perspective. Where Ahmed saw a luscious oasis filled with healthy
date palms, fig trees and barley I saw dry and parched earth. There were also many people
within L’Kasbat who thought Ahmed was over extending the limited resources of the village on
a mirage and I was never able to secure any type of funding because most of the foreign non1

The anecdotes throughout this thesis are used as rhetorical devices to introduce and frame the larger issues being
confronted by the people of the Akka oasis. They are only anecdotal and not intended to be understood as real data.
In addition, although all of the episodes represent real events and real people all of the names have been changed in
order to protect the individuals involved.
2
The Peace Corps has difficulty placing male volunteers in these rural communities. Because a majority of the men
spend the year away from the village, most village leaders are only willing to accept female volunteers.
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government organizations (NGOs) I spoke with believed it was a project that did not have a
secure outcome. However, I looked at L’Kasbat entirely from the perspective of a development
worker and failed to understand the political, historical, and social forces that compelled Ahmed
to make the choices he made. Indeed, my status as a development worker and, more specifically,
as an American and all the racial baggage which that entails, dramatically colored my
perspective on most of the social issues being confronted by Ahmed and his fellow villagers. I
was continuously forced to reconcile my subject position and my corresponding understandings
of race, ethnicity and the environment with what I was confronted with on a daily basis on the
ground in Akka. Kevin Dwyer (1982) argues that this process of reconciliation is always present
in the context of the anthropological encounter. The anthropological self and the anthropological
other each represent cultural and societal interests outside of themselves and in the process of the
confrontation both the self and the other are forced to question themselves and all that they
represent. It is within this context that I attempt to interrogate the forces surrounding the
confrontation between myself and the people of Akka.
My incredulity with regard to Ahmed’s vision is based on the fact that beyond the edge of
the oasis that gives life to L’Kasbat, dusty, rocky nothingness seems to spread out to the horizon
in every direction. Walk two hundred yards in any direction away from the oasis and the bright
green palm fronds that seem to explode from the top of their trees disappear from view, the
sounds of civilization slowly vanish and you are left with the impression that you are the only
one left in the world. This quiet serenity, however, masks the harsh reality of life on the Saharan
frontier as people are forced to maintain a constant struggle with the landscape in order to
maintain the health of the oasis and, by extension, the health of their villages.

5

L’Kasbat is part of an oasis community built around the small town of Akka, located
approximately 60 kilometers south of the province capital, Tata. Located near the Algerian
border, Akka presents as a town out of an old western movie. Flanked on the east by the AntiAtlas Mountains and marked by the brown jagged peaks of the Jebel Bani, Tata Province is a
barren and desolate place. It is extremely arid, with little to no precipitation and in the hot
summer months the temperature can reach 130 degrees (Although the thermometers often did not
have a high enough gauge to properly register the temperature). Its population of approximately
121,000 people resides in towns and villages built around desert oases that dot the landscape
every fifty or sixty kilometers. Before the colonial period, Akka and Tata were major ports in
trading networks that crisscrossed North and West Africa. Along with cities such as Abou Am
in the Ziz Valley and Ktaoua and other oases in the Drâa Valley, Akka served as a way station of
sorts for caravans that transferred their goods before heading south toward Tindouf and
Timbuktu or further north to the cities such as Marrakesh and Mogador. 3 “Imports from the
Sudan included ivory, gold dust, gum, ostrich feathers, and, most important, black slaves.
Southbound commodities arriving from Moroccan and Algerian towns for transshipment
included an array of North African and European manufactures” (Dunn 1977, p. 107). Toward
the end of the 19th century, trade through Akka and Tata began to diminish because traders began
to move their goods through the city of Guilmim in an effort to avoid the Berber tribes who
dominated the High Atlas mountain passes. With the exception of the transport of illegal slaves,
trans-Saharan trade dried up completely when the French occupied Timbuktu in 1894 and
imposed the international borders that still exist today.
Akka’s residents are predominately Ishalhin. Also known as Swasa or the singular Sousi,
Ishalhin are Berbers who speak Tashelhait, the Berber dialect spoken throughout the south of
3

Mogador is the modern city of Essouiara.
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Morocco including all of the Anti-Atlas Mountains and the southern High Atlas Mountains
stretching from Agadir on the coast to as far east as Demnat. In addition, it is also spoken in the
deep south of Morocco from Ouarzazate to Guilmim, the last major city before the Western
Sahara. The Berbers of Akka reside in seven villages that circle the oasis. Moving north from
Akka and counterclockwise around the oasis the villages are Tagadirt, Taourirt, Earhan or Ait
Rehal, Zawiya, l’Kasbat Sidi Abdullah Ben M’barek, Agadir Ouzrou and Tagadirt Lakhenetra.
Zawiya, approximately six to seven kilometers from Akka, marks the northern boundary of the
Akka oasis. The three other villages, including Akka, are populated by local Arab speaking
Akkawis and civil servants and military personnel from the north. The two remaining Arab
villages are Ait Anter and El Kebebat. 4
In addition to Arabs and Ishalhin, the Akka oasis is also home to of high percentage of
Black Moroccans, commonly known as Haratin or Drawi. 5 Linguistically, Black Moroccans fall
into the same categories as their countrymen. Simply put, they speak either Moroccan Arabic or
one of the Berber dialects as their primary language. Within the context of Akka, a majority of
Black Moroccans spoke Tashelhait as their natal tongue; however, there were also those residing
in El Kebebat and Akka who spoke Arabic as their first language. In other parts of Morocco,
Berber speaking Haratin are sometimes referred to as Rgaga, Iqbliyin or Isuqayn (Ilahiane 2006).
Yet, despite their linguistic and cultural affinity with their countrymen, their skin color consigns
them into a third ethnic category separate from both Berbers and Arabs. More specifically, being
Haratin effectively relegates a person to the bottom of the social hierarchy because, historically,

4

With the exception of Akka and Ait Rehal, the names of these villages are not found on any maps. They are taken
from observations made while I served as a Peace Corps volunteer from 2000 to 2002.
5
In Morocco, Haratin is a pejorative term and is often replaced by the term Drawi, a term used predominately in the
Drâa River Valley.

7

they were not allowed to own land, the primary cultural signifier for Berber tribes in the desert
south:
For the Ait Atta Berbers 6, land tenure was the founding pillar of law and tradition, azarf. 7
Land and tree tenure was virtually the decisive vehicle which the Ait Atta’s social
organization expressed itself…Someone other than a member of the Ait Atta and holy
Arab lineages could never acquire land in the Ait Atta land, particularly Haratine
(Ilahiane 2004, p. 80).
Land tenure has a deep symbolic significance beyond its economic value because embedded
within it is the fundamental concept of al-asl, or origin. A person or household without property
was judged as without al-asl. Black Moroccans are considered to be of dubious origin and lack
al-asl because their origins are either unknown or considered to be outside of Morocco, namely
the regions south of the Sahara. Anecdotally, whenever I mentioned in passing to someone that I
lived in Tata Province, I was asked what it was like to work with Africans. Though these were
always limited exchanges, it happened regularly enough that it provided me the proper
framework for how to understand the social hierarchy and the importance of place in Morocco. 8
In this thesis I analyze the historical and social processes that have produced the
complex environment of Akka from the perspectives of the people who live there. In particular,
it is a thesis regarding identity and how so many different markers of identity have developed in
Akka. Of course, within the broader Moroccan context, the fact of Berbers, Arabs and Haratin
living in close proximity to one another is not particularly remarkable. Indeed, they have been
living and interacting with each other since the Arabs swept through North Africa in the 7th
century. However, every individual and every place is distinct and this particular story is about
Akka and the variables that, although present in other areas of Morocco, have had a unique
6

The Ait Atta Berbers were the dominant Berber tribe in the Drâa River Valley and the Tafilalt oasis and were one
of the last tribes to be brought under control of the French. The Ait Atta also extended east into the High Atlas
Mountains. For more see Gellner (1969), Hart (1981) and Dunn (1971)
7
Azarf is the Tashelhait word for law.
8
Lack of al asl is not limited to Haratin as dubious origins are also assigned to foreign researchers. For examples,
please see Hoffman (2008) and Ensel (1999)
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impact on Akka. The axis around which this story will be told is the oasis itself and it should not
be viewed as either a simple blank canvas in which the culture of Akkawis is overlaid or a
neutral background to human activity. Instead, the oasis should be understood as an active
participant in the process of ethnicization. This theoretical approach was defined as the
‘dwelling perspective’ by Tim Ingold. “The landscape is constituted as an enduring record of -and testimony to – the lives and works of past generations who have dwelt within it, and in so
doing, have left there something of themselves (Ingold 2000, p. 189). Put simply, the landscape
and the bodies who dwell within that landscape are complimentary terms and cannot be
understood outside of that relationship. Ingold is trying to eliminate the tendency of dividing the
world into easy dichotomies. So, within the context of Morocco, and Akka in particular, instead
of trying to understand the field as Arab or Berber, black or white, African and North African it
is better to recognize it as an enmeshment of all of these various constituencies.
Ingold takes his aversion to easy dichotomies one step further and also suggests that
instead of viewing these objects as discrete entities that came into relation with each other at
some point in the past, they should be understood as only existing by virtue of the relationships
from which they are constituted. This mode of philosophical thought is very similar to that of
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1977). For them it is not
enough to speak of tangles, knots, or imbroglios; these still give a sense of combination
and mixing whereby previously distinct realms are increasingly brought into relation,
until they bleed into each other so completely that they become indistinguishable...what
exists are flows and intensities that give rise to temporary effects that we mistake as
static, ahistorical, ontological forms (Braun 2002, p. 265).
Of course, the landscapes in which these enmeshments are constituted are not ideologically
neutral fields. According to Lefebvre (1991), space in its many shapes and forms represents the
political use of knowledge to impose an ideology that is made to appear indistinguishable from
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knowledge. Deleuze and Guattari’s flows and intensities are used by those in in power to
discipline its citizens. Consequently places are not equally shared and experienced by everyone
within a community. In a place like Akka, ideologically dominate notions of race, blackness and
origin are used to discipline Arabs, Berbers and Black Moroccans.
It is also important to recognize that Akka cannot be viewed in isolation or as being
separate from the world because in addition to “dwelling” in Akka, Akkawis also dwell in both
the broader Moroccan context as well as the broader global context. As such, global and national
level political and social processes impact social arrangements in Akka and need to be
understood as part of the identity formation process. Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari’s
flows and intensities are played out on a global scale so that the processes that discipline Berbers
and Haratin in Akka are rearticulated in order to marginalize Arabs in the international public
sphere. For example, Akkawis spend an incredible amount of emotional energy pondering the
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their identification as Muslims compels them, almost
reflexively, to strongly articulate their support for the Palestinians to the point of stating that, if
they were able, they would join the fight against Israel. Unfortunately, this rather standard and
mundane political position coheres nicely with those Western narratives that generally equate
Arabs and Muslims with backwardness and violence. 9 Notwithstanding the recent uprisings
throughout the Arab world demanding greater democracy and freedom, protests against the
building of an Islamic community center two blocks away from ground-zero in New York as
well as the attempts by many U.S. state legislatures to officially ban Islamic Sharia Law suggest
that these narratives have become even more concretized since September 11th. Indeed, the
standard myth regarding the perpetuation of autocracy in the Middle East is the old colonial
9

This narrative also allows Israel’s activities in the occupied territories to go largely unnoticed in the United States
because their responses are viewed as combating terrorism and upholding democracy as opposed to being acts of
terror.
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trope that Arabs and Muslims are not ready for full Western style democracy. In this context, the
ongoing Arab Spring is constructed not as an intrinsically Arab or Muslim movement but rather
as a move away from Islam and tradition toward the modern liberalism of the West. As noted by
Charles Taylor, it is assumed by many that “the march to modernity will end up making all
cultures look the same” and non-Western cultures like those in the Middle East and North
African will ultimately looking a lot like the countries of the West (Taylor 2000, p. 366).
However, the social complexities that exist in Akka serve to complicate these easy dichotomies
that seem to serve politicians so well. As the experiences of Ahmed and his family suggest, the
differentiations between Islam and the West, Arab and Berber, Arab and African are not so
easily discerned.
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Methodology/Fieldwork
The data provided for this thesis was collected while I served as a Peace Corps volunteer
from 2000 to 2002. I was assigned as a Health and Sanitation Volunteer to the rural dispensaire
in L’Kasbat where I worked with two male nurses, who, although they were both Berber
speakers, were not from Tata Province. In this regard, L’Kasbat was quite fortunate because
most Health Ministry employees assigned to rural outposts were not Berber speakers. This made
providing health care extraordinarily difficult when most of your patients are Berber women who
do not speak any Arabic. After living in L’Kasbat for one year, I moved across the river to a
house with electricity in the village of Ait Rehal. 10 Although I served under the auspices of the
Moroccan Ministry of Health, my work as a volunteer often had little or nothing to do with
healthcare or working in the dispensaire. Culturally, the health of the family is the responsibility
of women; consequently, it is only women who utilize the dispensaire regularly, and, even then,
they would visit only intermittently. As such, I spent most of my time garnering the perspective
of men about the health and welfare of the village. Much of the questions for this thesis arose
from discussions with men about the lack of jobs to support their families, migration and the
health of the oasis. Indeed, the questions I have raised are taken directly from these
conversations in an effort to understand the rather dramatic social changes taking place in that far
corner of the globe. A place that, as it turns out, is not as far away from the world as it seems.
Because most of my time was spent living and interacting with Haratin and Berber
speakers in L’Kasbat and Ait Rehal, the point of view of Berber speakers such as Ahmed will be
given privilege over their Arab neighbors. Furthermore, because of the conservative Muslim
theology of most Akkawis my interactions with women were severely limited. Consequently,

10

In actuality, my house in L’Kasbat was one of the few that did not have electricity. Most of the houses in the Akka
oasis had electricity and the streets and passageways were lit with electric light until 2 a.m. every morning.
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the perspective will be exclusively that of male Akkawis. 11 More importantly, however, is the
radically different relationship Berber speakers and Haratin maintain with the oasis that is
exhibited in the outlooks of individuals like Ahmed. Put simply, what value does Ahmed place
on Akka that I, as a development worker, was unable to recognize? Historical circumstances
have evolved in such a manner that Berbers and Haratin have defined themselves through their
ties to a particular place; in this specific circumstance it is the Akka oasis. Consequently, they
continue to invest money garnered through remittances into the maintenance of their villages or,
in the case of the Haratin, into land acquisition with the goal of shifting the balance of power in
their favor. Conversely, Arabs have an identity outside of Akka embedded in the Moroccan
nationalist enterprise that is not directly impacted by demographic shifts brought about by
environmental decline or economic scarcity.

11

Although more conservative than there Berber counterparts in the mountains, Berber and Haratin women are more
liberal in that they will interact with men in public spaces, particularly a foreigner. However, women in Arab areas
are generally secluded. The only girls seen in Akka are generally those going to school.
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Ethnically Berber
Historically, a significant amount of intellectual energy has been spent on trying to
include Berbers into the greater history of Islam. According to Ernest Gellner (1973) this is an
extension of the fact that, unlike their non-Arabic co-religionists in places such as Iran or the
Indian sub-continent, Berbers did not maintain the memory of a history or culture before the
arrival of Islam. So, although Berbers are the indigenous people of North Africa 12, they do not
identify with their ancestors who lived in Morocco before the 7th century. Ibn Khaldun, in his
historical treatise on the Berber people credited them with being descended from Goliath and
following independence history texts taught children that Berbers were actually descendents of
Arab immigrants from Yemen (Hoffman 2008, p. 14). 13
Notwithstanding the failed attempt to introduce a pseudo-history of Berbers into the
collective national conscious, Moroccan Berbers have historically been difficult to categorize
because of what Stephanie Saad refers to as “ethnic quiescence” (Saad 2000). During the
Protectorate period, the French attempted to employ a strategy of divide and rule in an effort to
magnify the differences between Berbers and Arabs. With the “Berber dahir” of 1930, Berber
tribes were given autonomy that allowed them to govern their regions utilizing Berber customary
law as opposed to Muslim law. It essentially classified Berbers as noble savages and assigned
Arabs to the role of deviants who needed to be watched (Hart 2000). The French were not
entirely without precedent when they issued the Berber dahir because the strategy of divide and
conquer worked somewhat successfully with regard to Arab and Berber groups in neighboring
Algeria. Indeed, the Berber-Arab relationship in Algeria is quite volatile and has often resulted
12

Testimony for this is found in the Berber language. The Berber word for foreigner or outsider is ‘Romi,’or
‘Aromi,’ derivatives of the word Roman, one of the first invaders of the Maghreb. In some Berber areas, particular
in the desert south, there are people who refer to Arabs as ‘Romi,’ a reference to the status of Imazighen (Berbers) as
the first inhabitants of Morocco.
13
For more regarding the effort to include Berbers in the framework of Islamic history see Shatzmiller (2000) and
Hart (1999).
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in violence between the Arab dominated government and Berber activists in Kabylia. The most
well-known is the Berber Spring of 1980 when Berber speaking students took to the streets of the
Algerian capital, Algiers, demanding official language recognition. However, the French
drastically misunderstood the nature of Moroccan cultural identity and instead of promoting
Berber nationalism defined by its opposition to the Arab majority it ignited Arab nationalism and
promoted the Arab-Berber solidarity that eventually resulted in independence in 1956. “The
French…imported their own assumptions about the nature of ethnic groups into Morocco,
assuming that the existence of markers of ethnic identity implied the existence of self-defined
ethnic groups” (Saad 2000, p. 170). The French colonial enterprise, including the
anthropologists they employed to better grease the bureaucratic wheels of their empire,
misunderstood the distinction to be made between identity and cultural differences on the one
hand and actual ethnic consciousness on the other. In the case of Morocco, the dramatic
differences between the Arabic language and the various Berber dialects make obvious the
cultural distinctions between Arabs and Berbers. However, this recognition did not necessarily
correlate with any level of ethnic consciousness. Ethnic consciousness, according to John and
Jean Comaroff, only emerges with the fusion of totism, the recognition of collective
consciousness, and class, the assignment of these various cultural collectivities into hierarchical
assigned positions within the division of labor; consequently ethnic consciousness emerges only
as a result of specific historical forces (Comaroff 1992, pp. 50-52).
The French failure to understand the “ethnic quiescence” of Berbers inspired a wave of
anthropological literature dedicated to understanding why Berbers did not define themselves as
ethnically separate from their Arab countrymen. The two most prominent anthropologists in this
regard were Earnest Gellner and Clifford Geertz. For Gellner,

15

The Berber sees himself as a member of this or that tribe--within an Islamicallyconceived and permeated world—and not as a member of a linguistically defined ethnic
group, in a world in which Islam is but one thing among others (Gellner 1972, p. 13).
Gellner developed much of his theory around the dichotomy that existed between the bled al siba
and the bled al makhzan. 14 The bled al makhzan was land under direct control of the central
government whereas the bled al siba was not; more specifically, the government was unable to
collect taxes in the bled al siba without significant military intervention. Because the bled al
siba was dominated by Berber speaking tribes, most notably the Ait Waryaghar in the Rif
Mountains and the Ait Atta and Ait Yafalman in the High Atlas and southern desert, the division
between these two essentially cartographic categories has evolved to represent the ethnic
divisions between Arabs and Berbers where Berbers are deemed as synonymous with rural,
remote and ungovernable. Subsequently, the question then for Gellner was how did Berber
tribal societies function outside of the reach of the state apparatus?
The most important aspect of Berber identity, according to Gellner, was the tribal unit;
each consisting of segments of distinct agnatic-based family units which balance against one
another. “Cohesion is maintained not by agencies of coercion at home but by a threat from
outside; and hence at every level of size for which there is an ‘at home’, there must be a
corresponding ‘outside” (Gellner 1969, p. 42). The balance between these units maintains peace
within society without any centralized authority. Within his conceptualization of the segmentary
lineage model in the Moroccan context Gellner also included sharif-s, Islamic saints descended
from the prophet Mohammed, who mediated disputes between various segments of the tribe.
Amazigh, or Berber, identity, therefore, is centered more on the aforementioned kinship units

14

The notion of the makhzan has recently resurfaced in contemporary Moroccan political discourse. In its current
form, the makhzan is a term used to describe the social and political elites surrounding King Mohammed VI.
Instead of targeting the monarch, protestors calling for political and economic reforms have targeted the makhzan as
the source of their problems.
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which comprise his “tribe” and Islam. Anywhere a “notion of being Berber did exist, it was
roughly co-extensive with the regional linguistic block” (Gellner 1969, p. 15).
Since its initial publication, Gellner’s application of segmentary lineage theory has been
widely discredited mostly due to the fact that the basic theory of structural functionalism has
fallen out of fashion. Like Radcliffe-Brown (1965) and Evans Pritchard before him, Gellner fell
into many of the same theoretical traps by ignoring the historical processes which produced the
unique cultural circumstances he discovered in the High Atlas. By arguing that Berber society is
segmentary and premodern, Gellner essentially removed Berbers from the context of the modern
Moroccan nation state. Furthermore, on an even more basic level Gellner was just empirically
wrong. The Ait Atta tribe that was, for Gellner, the epitome of the segmentary and acephalous
society bore little resemblance to Gellner’s theory. 15 A fact borne out historically through the
ascendency of T’hami El Glaoui, the Berber Lord of Telouet. Before the arrival of the French,
El Glaoui, with the help of weapons provided by Sultan Moulay Hassan, ruled over the Tizi n’
Tishka, the main mountain pass which connected Marrakech to Tafilalet, Zagora and the other
main outposts of trans-Saharan trade (Brett and Fentress 1997, p. 187). In 1912 he helped
overthrow the Sultan resulting in the French assuming power. “By 1925 T’Hami el Glaoui,
appointed Pasha of Marrakech, had eclipsed all his rivals, and lorded it with legendary tyranny
over the High Atlas as a partner rather than a servant of the Resident in Rabat” (Brett and
Fentress 1997, p. 188). 16 Much of the Moroccan independence movement was organized around
opposition to El Glaoui’s collaboration with the French and membership in the primary
Moroccan nationalist party, the Istiqlal, was only permitted if Berbers renounced their Berber
identity as a colonial creation. As I shall discuss later, the Arab nationalism that swept the
15

For a more thorough critique of Geller’s theory of segmentation see both Henry Munson Jr. (1993) and Abdellah
Hammoudi (1980).
16
The exploits of T’hami el Glaoui are documented in Gavin Maxwell’s Lords of the Atlas (1966)
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French out of Morocco and Algeria has had a profound impact on the growth and evolution of
Berber ethnic consciousness that was not prominent before independence.
Clifford Geertz provided an alternative to Gellner’s theory of segmentation. As opposed
to Gellner who completed most of his work in the isolated mountain villages surrounding
Zaouiat Ahansal, Geertz along with his wife Hildred and his students (Lawrence Rosen, Paul
Rabinow, and Dale Eickelman) worked mostly in and around the city of Sefrou, south of Fez.
Geertz agreed with Geller in the sense that he recognized Berbers did not define themselves
under the broad general category of Berber or Imazighen and acknowledged the importance of
family and tribal affiliations. However, Geertz’s theory ascribed more significance to dyadic
personal relationships as opposed to abstract role based interactions (Saad 2000). In other words,
people establish social ties whenever they are advantageous instead of creating divisions that
inhibited the possibility of compromise or advancement.
Abstract markers of status, such as descent from the Prophet or advanced religious
education, might or might not be significant depending on how an individual was
embedded in relationships of...[personal obligation], and how skillfully those
relationships were manipulated (Saad 2000, p. 172)
Laurence Rosen (1979) suggested the need for multi-layered social networks evolved due to the
fluctuations in ecological variables. According to Rosen, both Arabs and Berbers are forced to
maintain alliances and relationships of obligation as a type of insurance policy against
environmental emergencies. For example, if there is little to no rain during the growing season
both Arab and Berber farmers have to establish personal relationships and networks outside of
their immediate family and village in order to counter this exigency. There are also scholars who,
although they take on the “Geertzian” model of dyadic interpersonal relationships, argue that
these interactions are not as easily negotiated as Geertz or Rosen suggest. Prominent among
these is Abdullah Hammoudi who proposes that these dyadic relationships are hierarchically
18

structured in order to ultimately serve the state apparatus. In this respect, Hammoudi is
describing power dynamics in a purely Moroccan sense and does not delineate specific Arab or
Berber notions of power (Crawford 2005, p. 180).
Yet, despite their ethnic quiescence, Berbers do exist and have maintained their linguistic
particularity in the face of a nationalist movement which viewed a unique “Berber” culture as a
kind of colonial construct and, as a consequence, built its independence movement around a
discourse that emphasized its links to Arab and Islamic civilization and a monarch who claimed
his legitimacy from being a sharif, a descendent from the Prophet Mohammed (Crawford 2005, p
164). 17 Remarkably, as Morocco has evolved, Gellner’s unwillingness to recognize Berbers as
an ethnic group has been superseded by events. According to Bruce Maddy-Weitzman:
The political, social and cultural evolutions of Morocco…coupled with events within the
Berber diaspora, have not only resulted in an increasing self-consciousness among
Berbers as Berbers…but have also given that self-consciousness a more explicit political
dimension (Maddy Weitzman 2011, p. 43)
The pressure placed on Moroccan authorities was such that, in 2002, King Mohammed VI
created the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (l’Institut Royal de la culture Amazigh, or
IRCAM). The King’s recognition of Berber culture as a prominent part of Moroccan national
identity indicated that Morocco’s Berbers were not simply historical residue, but unique from
their Arab countrymen.
Because the ethnic category of “Berber” was decided by Moroccan nationalists to be a
creation of the French colonial regime, official statistics regarding the number of Berber speakers
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A unique Berber identity is not necessarily a new phenomenon and many scholars have worked to establish that
there have been moments throughout history in which a broader sense of Berberness has been articulated.
Shatzmiller (2000) argues for the presence of Berber particularism as early as the 12th century during the Marinid
dynasty. The Marinids published Islamic texts using the Berber language as well as performing public ceremonies
in Berber. Of course, before the evolution of the modern nation state and the conflation of culture with the place and
space of the nation, the presence of multiple linguistic practices and ethnic minorities did not produce the same level
of paranoia that is present today. It is possible the Shatzmiller may be unintentionally projecting modern day
conceptualizations of political formations on the past.
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are unavailable and efforts made toward even an unofficial census are often met with hostility
(Hoffman 2008). Amazigh or “Berber” activists often place the number of Berber speakers
above 50 percent but the actual number is probably closer to 40 percent (Hart 2000). The
Ishalhin of Akka are a part of one of three main subgroups of Berbers in Morocco that include
the Imazighen and the Irifiyen. The Imazighen speak the Berber dialect of Tamazight although
they sometimes confusingly refer to their dialect as Tashelhait and re-label the more southern
variety of Tashelhait as Tasousit, or the dialect spoken in the southern Sous River valley.
Tamazight is also the general name applied to all Berber languages and dialects. The Imazighen
predominate the central and northern High Atlas Mountains, the Middle Atlas Mountains near
the cities of Fez and Sefrou as well as the southern desert provinces of Zagora and Er-Rachidia.
The Irifiyen reside mostly in the northern Rif Mountains and have a reputation as being isolated
and separate from the rest of Morocco due mostly to the Irifiyen’s tradition of resistance against
government authorities (Hart 2000).
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Haratin and Ismkhan
Before being sworn in as an official volunteer I completed two months of community
based training in a small village in the High Atlas Mountains, approximately 3 hours beyond
where the paved road ends near the city of Demnat. The purpose of community based training
was to acclimate us to the type of village we might be living in and to force interaction with
Berber speakers in order to acquire knowledge of Tashelhait more quickly. Not knowing where I
was going to eventually be assigned the structure of our training made sense. However, Berber
villages in the High Atlas are not as heavily influenced by the complexities of race that exist in
the desert villages on the Saharan frontier. During training no distinction was ever made
between people outside of the categories of Berber or Arab speaker and nothing was ever
mentioned regarding the notion of race. One of our Berber language instructors who I became
quite good friends with was Haratin from the city of Ouarzazate but he always included himself
when he discussed Berber speakers. In addition, the professor who administered our final
language proficiency examination was Haratin from the village of Touzounine, thirty minutes
south of Akka, also referred to himself as Ashelhi. Their perspective was quite nuanced and
evolved from having lived most of their life outside of the oasis and working with Americans, a
country made up almost entirely of people without al-asl. They recognized that the labels
ascribed to them were arbitrary and that they shared the same cultural traits with their Arab and
Berber countrymen. Their outlook is suggestive of Paul Gilroy’s (1993) concept of cultural
hybridity and the fact that cultures do not grow and evolve in a vacuum and instead are
constantly changing, interacting and borrowing from one another.
When I arrived in Akka I was under the impression that if someone spoke Berber they
were Berber and if they did not they were Arab. No one ever overtly disabused me of my
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misunderstanding of the dynamics regarding the social hierarchy in Akka and it resulted in a lot
of interesting conversations initiated by me in an attempt to understand the history of the area
and whether people defined themselves as Arab or Berber. Hajj Ahmed, himself Haratin, once
asked me if the people of L’Kasbat were Shluh, the Moroccan Arabic neologism for all Berbers.
Coming from Ahmed, this question struck as quite strange for two reasons. First, why would
Ahmed use the term Shluh to refer to Berber speaking Akkawis? In many Berber communities,
the term Shluh is generally considered an insult and a Berber would not use this word to describe
himself. Second, and perhaps more subtle because of the manner in which Ahmed framed the
question, why was a Berber man asking an aromee for a definition of his community? 18 It was
not until later that I recognized that Ahmed was actually trying to understand my, or more
specifically, the non-Moroccan’s perspective of the social dynamics of his village. He used the
term Shluh because it was a common Moroccan word used to distinguish Ishalhin and he knew I
would recognize it but also because he did not actually recognize himself as a Berber, despite the
fact that Tashelhait was his natal tongue. He has no stake in the use of the word Shluh.
Part of the reason no one within the Peace Corps pointed out my mistaken belief was due
primarily to the fact that they wanted us to perceive Morocco as a good and worthy place. In
addition to the goal of “development,” the Peace Corps is also about cultural exchange and my
supervisors wanted me to leave Morocco with a good impression of their home. This desire was
emphasized in Akka as I was constantly asked what I thought about Morocco. 19 To frame this
concept anthropologically, the lack of interest or desire in discussing race stems from what
historian Chouki el Hamel refers to as an embarrassment over Morocco’s historical enslavement
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Aromee is the Berber word for Christian and foreigner. It is a derivative of the word “Roman,” because the
Romans were the first invaders of Morocco.
19
A friend of mine from Agadir Ouzrou, who coincidentally now lives and works in Chicago, always begins our
conversations by questioning me what I liked most about Morocco.
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of fellow Muslims, a practice expressly forbidden in the Qu’ran. Put simply, Morocco has never
reconciled itself with either its slave holding past or its enslavement of the free born Haratin
during the reign of Moulay Ismail, the second Alawite Sultan. A significant part of this, of
course, is the wish to not air one’s dirty laundry in the presence of an outsider so any questions
involving race and slavery are often viewed as having hostile intentions. Given the history of
colonialism, the negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims that circulate in the West and the
continued military occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, this reticence is understandable. 20
Consequently, the issue of race is often concealed behind a curtain of Arabic and Islamic
hegemony resulting in a remarkable dearth of academic literature dedicated to the topic of race
and slavery in Islamic North Africa that is dominated mostly by scholars from Europe and the
United States.
Most modern Moroccan scholars argue that because there is so much interaction and
interconnection among the different ethnic groups in Morocco, Moroccans assert their
identity under the umbrella of Arab-Islamic culture and a “black identity” so that racial
issues do not exist (El Hamel 2002, p. 32).
John Hunwick also suggests that the lack of emphasis on questions of race is due largely
to the lack of significant recognition on the part of people of North Africa of their “Africaness.”
Subsequently, in contrast with the amount of literature produced regarding the trans-Atlantic
slave trade, the impact of slavery on the Islamic cultures of the Mediterranean has not been
extensively explored.
The African-ness of the Algerian, which is attested by history, is something he is largely
unconscious of; thus there can be no question of his admitting to it. He will only take
interest in it when the black world becomes essential for him. Then Algeria will belong
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This issue is most prominent in the political sphere which was always a hot topic due to the second Palestinian
Intifada and September 11th taking place while I lived in Morocco. Blame for Arab oppression was always placed at
the feet at the United States or Israel. Though their arguments were valid there was little recognition of the lack of
political freedom within many Arab countries that also carry much responsibility. This dynamic is changing with
the development of Arab satellite television stations such as Al-Jazeera. For more see Lynch (2006).

23

not only geographically or even politically to Africa, but also culturally (Hunwick and
Powell 2002, p. xi-xii).
While this is undoubtedly true, as evidenced by my regular interactions with individuals that
questioned me what it was like to work with Africans, more blame should be placed on the
Western intellectual tradition in Moroccan cultural studies and the limits it has placed on
research in Morocco; particularly when dealing with the study of Black Moroccans. For
example, academic stalwarts such as Earnest Gellner and David Hart made only brief mention of
Haratin in their work concerning Berber tribal society. Unfortunately, one of the enduring
legacies of colonialism and its intellectual corollary, Orientalism, has been the
compartmentalization of the categories of African Studies and Middle Eastern Studies. So
although Morocco is located in Africa and has a strong historical connection with West Africa, it
is generally included into the broader political and scholastic category of the Middle East and
North Africa. John Hunwick describes it thusly:
[I]t is a bold graduate student who would attempt to deconstruct it by working on the
history of black Africans in the Maghreb, not least because s/he may have a hard time
finding an interested (not to say knowledgeable) supervisor, but also because s/he may
have an even harder time finding a job. (Hunwick 2002, p. xiii)
Consequently, Morocco is defined as an Arab country with a large Berber speaking minority and
historically, little research has been done outside of these strictly defined categories.
How are we then to understand the place and space of Black Moroccans? When trying to
explain the people of Akka to friends and colleagues back home it proved difficult to avoid the
traditional racialized discourse that predominates in the West. However, it was not a matter of
simply attaching a hyphenated ethnic identity marker because, geographically speaking, all
Moroccans are African. Furthermore, conceptualizations of “Blackness” in Morocco are not
solely determined by the color of one’s skin because distinctions are made between Arabs,
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Berbers and Black Moroccans as well as between Sub-groups of Black Moroccans despite there
being little to no discernable difference in skin color. Consequently, the accepted Western
language of racial discourse holds little meaning in Morocco’s desert provinces.
In order to answer this question I want to elaborate further on the many layers of
complexity concerning blackness within Morocco. Black Moroccans are located primarily in
Morocco’s desert provinces including Ouarzazate, Zagora and Er Rachidia and are generally
designated by the term Haratin. The term Haratin has evolved so that it has become synonymous
with the bilad-al-Sudan, the region south of the Sahara; however, within the Moroccan context,
there is a lot of confusion regarding the origins of Haratin and it has produced many different
etymological interpretations. There are some historians who have argued that slaves who were
sold at the slave market in Kaharta in West Africa came to be known as Hartani, 21 while others
have suggested that Hartani should be understood as a derivation of the words Hurr (free) and
tani (second), indicating that, although the Haratin are free, they never lose their link to their
slave past (Ensel 1999, p. 26). The latter explanation was the theory of historian Ahmed b
Khaled al-Nasiri, a prominent Moroccan writer during the 19th century and an outspoken critic of
Morocco’s historical involvement in the slave trade (El Hamel 2006, p. 180). Still others have
argued that the word Haratin is derived from the Arabic word haratha, which translates as “to
cultivate,” thus signifying the Haratin status of being sedentary cultivators, particularly in the
oases of the Drâa and Ziz River Valleys, regions dominated by the pastoralist Ait Atta tribe. In
all probability, however, the term Haratin probably originates from the Berber word aherdan,
which signifies dark color, particularly in relation to skin color. This term is used to contrast the
dark skinned Aherdan from the white Imazighen. The Berber speaking Tuareg of the Sahel
region also use a similar word, acherdan, as an indication of bi-racial children. In Tashelhait
21

Hartani is the singular form for Haratin (Ensel 1999)
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speaking areas such as Akka, the Berbers use the words Isuqayn (sing. Asuqi) and aharadani to
label Black Moroccans. These terms are often used interchangeably and El Hamel (2006)
suggests the possibility that these words may be used to differentiate between Haratin and
Ismkhan, descendents of slaves who are still able to trace their lineage back to the bilad-alSudan. In the context of Akka, the term Isuqayn, loosely translated, means people of the souk.
The expression has very negative connotations because it equates Black Moroccans with the
dirtiness of the souk.
The common thread running through this line of reasoning is the assumption that the
Haratin have origins outside of Morocco, specifically in the bilad-al-Sudan, and were brought to
Morocco as part of the trans-Saharan slave trade. Although this narrative conforms nicely to
racialized Western discourses that automatically equate Blackness with the space of sub-Saharan
Africa it runs counter to the oral history of the Haratin which suggests that they have lived in
Morocco’s since before the Arab invasion and have always been free. 22 There is also a growing
literature which indicates the Haratin have lived in southern Morocco since before the Berbers.
Haratin were probably indigenous to the oases on the northern fringes of the Sahara and were
forced into a client relationship with the Berber tribes either when the Berbers were forced south
by the Romans or perhaps on the eve of the Arab conquest in the 6th century (El Hamel (2002),
Ilahiane (2004), Ensel (1999)). Their status as nomads and their knowledge in the use of horse
and camel gave Berbers the advantage over the sedentary and oasis dwelling Haratin.
The quest for control of the trans-Saharan trade to supplement a resource poor ecology
would, in the end, set in motion the mechanisms of the incipient social stratification
structure in the region. Nomads, Jewish and Arab merchants controlled the organization
of the caravan trade…while Haratine became the oasis tillers (Ilahiane 2004, p. 42).
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For more regarding oral history please see Ilahiane, Hsain (1998)
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This is a remarkably subversive ideological claim that challenges the hegemonic narratives that
locates blackness outside of Morocco. In addition to confronting the bifurcation of the African
continent into North and sub-Saharan Africa, this claim also challenges the hegemony of the
Arabo-Berber historical narrative within Morocco.
Adding further to the confusion regarding the origins of the Haratin are hierarchical and
taxonomic distinctions made between Haratin and the aforementioned Ismkhan. Sub-groups
within both the Drâa and Ziz River Valleys continue to claim the title of Ismkhan, the Tamazight
Berber word for slaves, in order to distinguish themselves from Haratin. The oral history
regarding the slave trade, which did not end completely until the final defeat of the Ait Atta by
the French in the 1930s, is still relatively fresh so there are many who are able to trace their
origins directly back the bilad-al-Sudan (Becker 2002). Most Ismkhan indicate that they are
recent arrivals to Morocco in that they came within the last three or four generations right at the
close of the trans-Saharan slave trade. By doing so, the Ismkhan claim a specific al-asl and
connect themselves to the myth that the people of the bilad-al-Sudan are all descended from Sidi
Bilal, the first muezzin of Islam. The Baraka, or Devine blessing, received by Bilal from the
prophet Mohammed allows for the acceptance of Ismkhan within oasis society even though they
were slaves (Becker 2002). More importantly, the origin myth integrates the Ismkhan into the
general history of Islam and gives them a direct link to the prophet Mohammed. The primary
variable used by Ismkhan to distinguish them from Haratin is the color of their skin. Their dark
skin is indicative of their recent arrival to Morocco; as opposed to Haratin who tend to have
fairer skin indicating centuries of inter-marriage with Berber and Arab tribesmen.
The Ismkhan have chosen an identity cloaked in the well-established cultural framework
of the African diaspora. They have identified themselves as being descendents of slaves from
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south of the Sahara. However, despite their strong declarations of an origin in sub-Saharan
Africa, there is a degree of insecurity in acknowledging one’s slave past. It places one’s origins
outside of Morocco and delinks them from a potential connection to the prophet. It also
indicates the possibility of pagan ancestors and a past mired in false belief. Being a part of the
community of believers is arguably the most important part of Moroccan national identity. It is
the reason that little is known about the Berbers prior to the Arab invasion and so much effort
was made to integrate the Berber tribes into the history of Islam. It is also the reason why the
Ismkhan have created an origin myth linking them to Sidi Bilal in an effort to distinguish
themselves from the Haratin, the people without a history.
Within the broader Moroccan context, the difference between Haratin and Ismkhan
should not be carried too far because, as Ensel (1999) points out, they are still placed in a
subordinate category and, for a majority of Moroccans, Haratin are not distinguished from
Ismkhan; a fact demonstrated by the continued debate surrounding the etymology of the word
Haratin. This oversimplification relates back to that mentioned earlier regarding the
discomfiture discussing the history of race in Morocco and the creation of an all slave army by
Sultan Moulay Ismael. 23 Although Black slaves were often used in armies in Islamic North
Africa, Moulay Ismail’s abid-al-Bukhari, was “the supreme example if the use of such troops in
the Mediterranean world” (Hunwick 1992, p. 19).
When Ismael ascended to throne in 1672, Morocco was a model of political instability.
The Sufi orders in Fez openly challenged the legitimacy of the Alawite dynasty by questioning
whether they were descended from the prophet Mohammed; the tribes of the bled al siba who
controlled the lucrative trans-Saharan slaved routes refused to submit to Alawite authority and
23

Ismael was renowned for being quite violent. One legend suggests that he would often randomly behead one his
slaves while they were working in order to instill fear and compel them to always work their hardest lest they lose
their head.
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Morocco was under threat from the Portuguese in the port city Mogador and the Ottoman Turks
in Algiers. Consequently, Ismael felt it necessary to strengthen his military to consolidate his
hold on power. Traditionally, Moroccan Sultans depended upon soldiers hired from politically
supportive tribes for favors from the court that generally included land grants and tax
exemptions. However, Ismael believed this process to be unreliable and instead ordered the
creation of the abid-al Bukhari, an army made entirely of slaves completely loyal to the Sultan.
In order to fill the ranks of his army, Ismail ordered the enslavement of the free Haratin as well
as the purchase of all slaves deemed to be appropriate. “No black person was spared, whether
the person was slave or free black or Hartani. In one year 3,000 blacks were gathered from the
area around Marrakesh alone. There, the color of skin was reason enough to be enslaved (el
Hamel 2006, p. 191). The enslavement of the free Haratin was an incredible precedent that
broke with all of the tenets of Islamic law that forbade the enslavement of free Muslims. Ismail
justified his maneuvers by arguing that the Haratin were the same as slaves and had illegally
procured their freedom or that the ranks of his army were built through military expeditions to
the Sudan. 24 Despite protests by the Muslim Ulama (Islamic courts) in Fez, impressment of
Haratin into military service continued well into the 19th century and the ranks of Ismail’s army
swelled so that at one point it contained well over 150,000 troops (Ensel 1999, p 46). Like the
Sultan himself, the abid-al Bukhari became renowned for a propensity toward violence and
brutality and they were often used as an occupying force in the unruly lands of the bilad-al-siba.
The fact that the occupying force was comprised entirely of slaves and Haratin cemented the
resentment felt by “white” Moroccans toward their Black countrymen that endures to this day
(el-Hamel 2006, p. 194). Indeed, the creation of the abid-al-Bukhari marked a major turning
24
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sub-Saharan Africa. For more on the sources of manpower and a more detailed overall analysis for the abid-alBukhari please see Meyers (1977).
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point in race relations in contemporary Morocco resulting in the fusion of words so that ‘abd
(slave) and aswad (black) and Haratin became interchangeable. According to al-Nasiri, the
Moroccan historian critical of the trans-Saharan slave trade for its blatant trafficking of Muslim
slaves,
People have become so inured to that, generation after generation, that many common
folk believe that the reason for being enslaved according to the Holy Law is merely that a
man should be black in color and come from those regions [the Sudan]. This, by God’s
life, is one of the foulest and gravest evils perpetrated on God’s religion, for the people of
the Sudan are Muslims having the same rights and responsibilities as ourselves (Hunwick
and Powell 2002, p. 45).
One final elaboration is required to fully understand all of the variables involved in
constructing Blackness within Morocco. In Islamic societies like Morocco, lineage is established
by the status of the father and a child born to African concubines will claim the Arab or Berber
identity of his father. Any notion of being African is abandoned. For example, Moulay Ismail
was the son of an African slave concubine. Consequently, distinctions made based upon skin
color can sometimes be quite arbitrary. Ismkhan, because of their recent arrival are considered to
have the darkest skin color whereas Haratin are perceived to have skin color between that of
“black” Ismkhan and “white” Imazeghen and Shurfa indicating their earlier arrival to Morocco
and subsequent intermingling with the Arab and Berber tribes. However, each of the various
sub-groups in southern oasis communities, whether they are Arab or Berber or Haratin, are all
populated by dark-skinned individuals. Stephen Small summarizes it thusly:
Variations based on skin-color are in the eye of the beholder, but they are shaped by
localities, prevailing understandings and subjectivities, themselves reflecting the
particular histories of nations and cities. So who is Black is not something we should
take for granted (Hine et al. 2009, p. xxvi).
It is partly through this lens which we should try to understand conceptualizations of race in
Morocco. Race, in this sense, is closely connected with the concept of lineage and the absence
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of genealogical connections to the historical or religious pantheon of Islam is what effectively
rendered one as Black (Hall 2005). This formulation of race can be understood as race in the
lower case. There is some debate regarding the origins of the concept of race and many have
argued that it is a strictly Western concept that can be traced to the history of plantation based
slavery in the United States. In this more widely recognized form, a race is differentiated by
recognizable physical differences, i.e., skin color, and these differences manifest themselves in
political, social and economic situations in such a way that a clear hierarchy is established.
However, this imagined form of race privileges American and European formulations of race and
does not allow for elaboration in areas of the world not defined by the black, white dichotomy.
This westernized conceptualization of race was criticized by Takezawa (2005) and Dikötter
(1994, 1997) who recognized racialized hierarchies in China and Japan that did not strictly
conform to the western conception of race. Indeed, it was Takezawa who elaborated the broader
definition of race in the lower case in order to include the experience of regions outside of
Europe and the United States. She provides three general features: racial characteristics, both
visible and invisible, are inherited across generations and cannot be easily changed by
environmental factors; boundaries are drawn between groups in order to exclude the other and a
clear hierarchy exists; the hierarchy manifests itself in economic and political institutions
(Takezawa 2005, p. 7). Using Takazawa’s framework allows us to better understand the nature
of Morocco’s racialized identities separate from that of the West.
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The Arab Majority
Hassan was a teenager from the small Arab speaking village of Laqabeba. Laqabeba is
located approximately 200 meters east of Akka and, with the exception of women, all of its
inhabitants work in Akka as teachers or shopkeepers or migrate to the north. There was no effort
made toward exploiting the land because the village was too far away from the oasis to make
irrigation possible and no one in the village could afford a motorized pump. When I first arrived
in Akka, there were approximately one to two hectares of land that had been plowed indicating
the possibility that some effort was being made toward cultivation. However, when I left Akka
for the final time, the ploughed land was in almost the exact same condition as it was when I first
arrived two years before. Because no one worked in Laqabeba, it reminded me somewhat of an
American suburb from which people commute to and from work every day. 25
Hassan’s family owned a shop in Kénitra, a city located north of the Moroccan capital
Rabat and his father spent most of the year working there. Hassan was a freshman enrolled in
Akka’s high school. The Moroccan educational system is driven by language instruction and
after Modern Standard Arabic, mandatory French language is introduced in primary school and
mandatory English is introduced in the first year of High School. Hassan was quite remarkable
because he had studied English for a little less than a year but was already able to engage me in
complex conversations in English. Indeed, his remarkable acquisition of English was such that
his teachers asked me and another Peace Corps volunteer living in the area to explore the
possibility of him attending University in the United States. 26 Somewhat ironically, he never
really learned to speak French very well despite having studied it for several years through
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The obvious exception to this is women who always put in long hours completing the work of the house that
included cooking, cleaning and childcare.
26
Unfortunately, this dream was short lived because Hassan’s father died of a heart attack, forcing Hassan to step
into the space previously occupied by his father and work in Kénitra
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primary and middle school. His reasoning for his success with English was that English just
flowed for him. Hassan was also unique in that he spoke Tashelhait even though he came from
an Arabic family. Indeed, this was the case for most if not all Akkawi Arab families. My
“official” Tashelhait language instructor was actually an Arabic secondary school teacher from
Ait Anter and one of the nurses assigned to the dispensaire in L’Kasbat spoke Tashelhait despite
being an Arab speaking Hartani from Laqabeba. This phenomenon is not entirely without
precedent as the language hierarchy has historically shifted back and forth and Arab speakers
have switched languages after marrying into a Tashelhait speaking families. This is particularly
true in the Sous Valley where Tashelhait and the southern dialect of Moroccan Arabic share
many lexical features (Hoffman 2008).
However, this phenomenon has become less common since independence and outside of
Akka, there are no longer many Moroccan Arab speakers who speak any of the Berber dialects.
Aside from the occasional Peace Corps volunteer or visiting anthropologist, Berber is no longer
spoken by outsiders. Arabic and French have become the dominate languages in North Africa,
so there is little reason for a non-Berber speaker to learn the language. None of the Arab
speakers from other parts of Morocco assigned to Akka in government posts such as the post
office, the gendarmerie or the dispensaire spoke any Tashelhait. 27 Whenever I asked Hassan
about his ability to speak Tashelhait he was never able to provide a very satisfying answer
beyond stating he was Akkawi and had always been able to speak Tashelhait. Hassan’s relative
indifference toward his ability to speak Berber was representative of the general overall attitude
held by Akkawi Arab speakers who saw little significance in their bilingual ability. It was an
afterthought born from the fact that they were never actually forced to speak Tashelhait, even
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The Akka oasis has two dispensaires or health clinics. The specific one I was assigned to was located in L’Kasbat.
A larger on is located in Akka.
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when interacting with Berber speakers in areas where Berber speakers are the overwhelming
majority of the population. Hoffman encountered many Berber speakers who demonstrated
significant anxiety over this fact:
You are forced to speak Arabic with them. If there are eight people in a room and only
one person doesn’t speak Tashelhait, you’re forced to speak Arabic. Otherwise the Arab
says, “What are you saying? Are you talking about me?” (Hoffmann 2008, p. 56)
The casual bilingualism displayed by Akkawi Arabs is illustrative of a change in the
cultural hierarchy that has shifted heavily in favor of Arabic. Since independence, the symbolic
capital associated with dareeja 28 has greatly outdistanced that associated with Tashelhait and
Tamazight. Theoretically, this slow process of Arabization in North Africa and the subsequent
marginalization of the Berber culture began when the first Moroccan dynasty was established by
Moulay Idriss in the newly built city of Fez in 789. However, it was the Moroccan nationalist
movement against the French that securely tied Moroccan identity to Arab and Islamic
civilization and the monarchy’s ability to trace its patrilineal lineage back to the prophet
Mohammed. Arab nationalism was subsequently reinforced by the newly independent state’s
efforts to generalize education and allow access for everyone. “Moroccan schools favored the
existing social class structure and helped reproduce it as well by consolidating material and
symbolic capital among the urban, Arabic speaking elite” (Hoffman 2008, p. 23). “Access for
everyone,” unfortunately, did not include Berber speakers in areas such Akka where government
schools were not built until well into the 1980s and 1990s. Of course, for individuals who
identify themselves as Arabs, the increased marginalization of the Berber culture and language or
the outright refusal to recognize the contributions of Berbers as intrinsically Berber is not
necessarily significant. Their identity as Arabs is secure regardless of the continued
desertification of the Akka oasis or their ability to work the land. Consequently, Hassan’s
28

Moroccan Arabic

34

relationship with the landscape and his “dwelling perspective” is markedly different when
juxtaposed with his Berber and Haratin neighbors. In Akka, this is borne out in reality as the
three Arabic speaking villages are completely disconnected from the oasis making any type of
cultivation impossible without the use of a motorized water pump. 29 The fact that the three Arab
speaking villages are Berber place names suggests the possibility that Akka, at one point in its
history, was populated entirely by Berber speakers and Berbers have been unable to adapt to the
demographic shifts initiated by the French colonial government and maintained by the postcolonial Moroccan government in Rabat. 30
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There was one family in Akka who had the economic wherewithal to purchase a mechanized well. The father was
the director of the dispensaire and his son was an English teacher.
30
It is impossible to speculate further on the historic cultural makeup of the Akka oasis. However, the village of
Tagadirt was populated by Tashelhait speaking Jewish merchants as recently as the 1960s before they emigrated to
Israel.
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Demographic Shifts and Environmental Change
Ahmed and I were of two different mindsets when it came to how to approach the needs
of his village. As a Peace Corps volunteer I technically served under the auspices of the
Moroccan Health Ministry and I had regular contact with Ministry officials during its various
health initiatives. 31 Consequently, I was present for conversations which were quite derogatory
toward the Berber speaking communities of Tata Province, particularly those populated by
Haratin. Furthermore, discussions with elementary school teachers assigned to Akka also
suggested that they did not have the children’s best interests in mind when they took on the job.
Consequently, I was always stressing education, finding Berber speaking teachers and promoting
general Berber rights that would force government authorities to recognize the needs of Berber
speakers mired in rural poverty. While Ahmed agreed the government had failed in its
responsibility and always prefaced all of our discussions by demonstrating his love for his
mother tongue he was always focused on general and immediate material needs through
agricultural expansion. For Ahmed, all the Berber language allowed him to do was communicate
with his friends and family in the village. It did not garner him access to the government
machinery that would provide resources for L’Kasbat, nor did it allow him access to areas
outside of Morocco where information was traded in languages like French or English. Indeed,
in his mind Berberness was, on some level, a liability and he eventually pressured me into
starting an English program for men in the village who might be interested. Being Berber meant
little when compared to long term village survival. At some later point, in an attempt to counter
Ahmed’s rather salient argument, I questioned his son, Brahim, who had completed his teaching
degree and was now an elementary school teacher in Guilmim, a city a few hours further south of
Akka on the road to the Western Sahara. I asked him why he had chosen to work in Guilmim
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when Akka was in desperate need of Berber speaking teachers. Brahim also prefaced his point
by stating that he loved his home, but stated there was nothing for him in L’Kasbat. He wanted
to see more of the world than just L’Kasbat and then sagely pointed out that I, too, was living
and working a long way from home. And, he added, in America there is actual employment.
Although Ahmed spent a majority of the year in L’Kasbat he also travelled regularly to
Fez to help oversee the café that he managed with his brothers. Like most Akkawis, Ahmed and
his family have long depended on the money earned from economic ventures outside of the
village to help to support their families. This type of migration is not a particularly new
phenomenon and the practices of Berber migrants have been a topic for Western scholars since
before the end of the colonial period. According to John Waterbury (1973), the Swasa tribes of
the Anti-Atlas Mountains have been dependent on South-North migration since the Second
World War. So much so, that Tashelhait speaking Berbers have an almost ubiquitous presence
in almost all of Morocco’s major cities and have virtually monopolized Morocco’s dry goods
industry and stores which sell staples such as rice, sugar, flour and tea are dominated by the
Ishalhin. It is somewhat remarkable that seemingly every hanout, or corner store, in almost
every major city is managed by a Tashelhait speaker from the Sus. There is some doubt to when
circular migration became the dominate form of survival for southern Berber speakers.
Waterbury suggests that the Swasa began their migratory lifestyle toward the end of the
nineteenth century when a particularly severe famine completely devastated their already
agriculturally marginal Anti-Atlas homelands. Waterbury cited environmental variables such as
soil erosion, deforestation and population growth, in addition to social factors such as tribal
maintenance, feuds and rivalries as the primary reasons forcing the Swasa to look beyond their
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valleys for their material needs. Writing almost ten years earlier, E.A. Alport (1964) offers a
similar explanation for Swasa migration:
The reasons for Ammeln and Swasa emigration are not far to seek. The slopes of the
Jebl Lkest 32 are completely denuded, except quite low down, and the valley bottom is
stony and arid except close to the stream, the Assif Amel, or in places where trees have
been planted or where springs provide irrigation (Alport 1964, p. 162).
Alport, however, places a lot of the impetus on the establishment of the Protectorate government
which allowed easier modes of communication and greater security. Perhaps most realistically,
informants for Katherine Hoffman (2002) do not really remember a time in which the Anti-Atlas
Mountains provided for their families; although initial statistics collected by the Protectorate
bureaucracy indicate that men from the village of Idda ou Zeddout where she worked were
engaged in long distance trade by at least 1920s (Hoffman 2002, p. 938). For the Haratin, out
migration is a more contemporary phenomenon. As noted earlier, the Berber tribes of the south
prevented Haratin families from acquiring land as a means of reinforcing their status as
outsiders. Since independence, however, infrastructure improvements intended to promote
industrial development have opened up economic opportunities in the north for Haratin who had
previously been confined to the oasis. This new reality, combined with the newly acquired status
of full Moroccan citizenship convinced Haratin to migrate north to find work.
In desert areas such as Akka, which had historically been outposts for trans-Saharan trade
it is somewhat more difficult to determine when the first major waves of out-migration began.
Ahmed’s father regaled me with tales about working in Fez during WWII, explaining that
American troops were much better tippers than their French counterparts. This small anecdote
suggests the possibility that migration, even for Haratin families, has been taking place since at
least before mid-century. Alport also argues that Akkawis had established themselves as the
32

The Jebel Lkst, along with the Ammeln Valley are located just north of the city of Tafrout in the Anti-Atlas
Mountains.
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predominate guild of charcoal makers in Fez by mid-century. Unlike the Ziz and Drâa River
Valleys, Tata Province is not part of a major river system and has never been able to engage in
the level of large scale agriculture available in those areas. The Drâa River technically runs
southeast of Tata Province and marks Morocco’s southern border with Algeria before emptying
into the Atlantic Ocean. However, it stops running above ground just south of the city of
Mhamid in Zagora Province and by the time it reaches Akka it is just a valley of stones. It is
highly probable that, unlike their desert neighbors further north, cities and towns in Tata
Province were entirely dependent upon trans-Saharan trade. Consequently, when the French
imposed national borders on West Africa and put an end to all non-illicit trade in the late 19th
century, Tatawis were forced to migrate north in order to survive.
Ahmed’s younger brother, Omar, owned approximately one to two hectares of land on
the outskirts of the village. Unlike much of the other farming plots spread throughout the oasis,
Omar did not depend on irrigation from the river to feed his land. Instead he invested money
earned from migrant labor in a motorized water pump and drew water directly from the large
aquifer that provided the oasis with its drinking water. By doing so he was able to bypass the
extraordinarily complex legal miasma surrounding the distribution of water for farming. 33 In
addition, he was also able to utilize land outside of the main farming districts of the oasis that
had historically been considered too marginal to attempt to cultivate. His farming plot was still
in its beginning stages so it was too early to tell whether or not he would be even minimally
successful. When I visited him one day I pointed to the initial successful growth of his newly
planted date palms as an auspicious sign. He agreed that they were coming in nicely but added
that it would not make much of a difference and he would still have to eventually return to Fez in
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The arrangements regarding water “rights” are too complex to go into great detail here. However, for a detailed
account of the structure of irrigation agriculture in Morocco see Geertz (2008)
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order to work. His current yield of barley would probably never provide enough flour for his
family and his date palms were a long way from producing fruit for the souk. Omar placed most
of the blame for migration on the national government and their unwillingness to invest in desert
villages like L’Kasbat. He believed that tractors and other large farming equipment was
necessary to make farming worthwhile enough so people would no longer have to migrate.
Anything less than that, in Omar’s mind, was almost not worth the effort.
Considering the amount of backbreaking labor that was invested into trying to farm a
piece of the desert for the small reward of never actually having any significant yield, Omar’s
desire was quite understandable. It was also difficult to disagree with Omar’s assessment of the
lack of investment in rural areas such as Tata Province. Morocco is functioning far below its
agricultural potential as most investment in the agricultural sector goes toward the 15 percent the
arable land that is actually irrigated (Swearingen 1996). Irrigated lands are favored by the
government because they produce cash crops such as citrus fruits and vegetables which are
earmarked for export despite the fact that this market has been undercut by heavily subsidized
citrus fruit producers in Spain and Portugal. This policy includes only a very small minority and
virtually eliminates access to government agricultural assistance to the thousands of villagers
such as Omar who live in the mountains and the pre-Saharan desert oases and maintain more
traditional techniques geared toward subsistence as opposed to mass production for foreign
markets. Three quarters of rural households own less than two hectares of land and 16 percent of
rural households have no land at all (Sabagh 1993, p. 32). Irrigated lands are also generally
owned by clients of the monarch or by the royal family itself so that any profits from this sector
remain in Rabat. 34 Consequently, there remains a large disparity in per capita agricultural
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It is this concentration of wealth in the hands of the makhzan that has fueled many of the protests by the February
20th movement throughout this spring.

40

income ranging from 35,000 dirhams to less than 1000 dirhams. Through actual land reform,
reinvestment in non-irrigated crops such as cereals and a return to the cultivation of barley
instead of wheat, Morocco might be able to significantly increase its production of staple crops,
decrease its overall debt burden and limit the effects of drought (Munson 1988, p. 566).
Unfortunately, the Moroccan policy focused on developing an agricultural sector geared
toward export to European markets is further undermined by trade agreements negotiated
between Morocco and the E.U. Although certain aspects of globalization have the potential for
raising millions of people out of poverty the methods and agencies employed often do more to
maintain the status quo as opposed to alleviating poverty. In particular, Joseph Stiglitz (2003)
argues that the developed world demands that developing countries open their markets
completely while corporate interests in the West petition the World Trade Organization to inhibit
competition from foreign producers. “The Western countries pushed trade liberalization for the
products they exported, but at the same time continued to protect those sectors in which
competition from developing countries might have threatened their economies” (Stiglitz 2003, p.
60). This is particularly true for Morocco’s farmers. Because of the massive subsidies provided
to citrus farmers in Spain and Portugal, Morocco is virtually eliminated from the European
Market.
The aggregate subsidies of the United States, EU, and Japan (including hidden subsidies,
such as on water), if they do not actually exceed the total income of…Africa, amount to
at least 75 percent of that region’s income, making it almost impossible for African
farmers to compete in world markets (Stiglitz 2006, p. 85).
Besides Morocco’s inability to compete in world markets, the internal market for cereals is also
undermined by these trade agreements along with the loan conditions enforced by the IMF.
Morocco is forced to eliminate price controls and subsidies to its farmers while at the same time
allowing unfettered access to its markets for subsidized cereals from the EU. Any attempts at
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constructive agricultural reform are undermined because trade agreements prevent the Moroccan
government from assisting its wheat and barley farmers.
Akka’s agricultural economy is limited to low-level, irrigation-fed agriculture and an
even more limited pastoralism. 35 The craggy, rocky cliffs of the Jebel Bani offer little in terms
of grazing land so the Ishalhin must grow alfalfa in order to feed their small herds. Outside of
dates, alfalfa is the primary crop of the oasis. Growing crops for consumption by animals
contrasts with the long history of transhumance practiced by the Berber tribes further north in the
Draa and Ziz River Valleys. I wondered aloud to Omar whether or not any type of large scale
investment was worthwhile given the environmental constraints in Akka. On this point, Omar
agreed but he challenged my assessment with the belief that until the last decade or so, the
village had been able to maintain a minimal level of subsistence whereas now everyone is
dependent on the products sold at the twice weekly souk in Akka. Walking southeast of Omar’s
plot of land allows you to see what Omar is talking about. You enter a virtual no-man’s land
filled with the crumbling remains of mud walls and the random solitary palm tree indicating that
the oasis once extended further than its current position. This area, according to the oral history
of the residents of L’Kasbat, used to be quite lush and has only recently undergone an extended
period of decline. There are several variables contributing to the decline of the Akka oasis but
the one in the minds of most Akkawis is al bayud, the date wilt virus. Bayud was first
discovered in Morocco in the Dar`a oasis in 1890 and is triggered by the Fusarium oxysporium
fungus. The fungus attacks the trees at their roots and younger trees are highly susceptible and
will often die within weeks of contracting the virus.
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There are a significant number of nomadic families that maintain herds of camels, sheep and goats throughout
Tata Province. They are not necessarily residents of Tata and speak a dialect of Arabic distinct from Moroccan
Arabic. However, their presence indicates the possibility of engaging in a more extensive level of pastoralism not
currently practiced.
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Pereau Leroy, a French date palm geneticist, reported that by 1950 al-bayud had
destroyed 10,000,000 palms…Regions that boasted a high density of 300 to 400 palms
per hectare, and where intercropping was virtually unknown…were reduced to five to ten
palms per hectare. The ravages of al-bayud have forced emigration of the population
from severely contaminated areas (Ilahiane 2004, p. 141).
Date palms are more susceptible to al-bayud when they are inter-planted with subsistence crops
as is the case in Akka. Reduction in the amount of irrigation water would slow the growth of the
virus; however, this would not only make the tree less productive but also limit the already small
amount of subsistence farming. Akka has been hard hit by al-bayud and much of the work done
by Ahmed’s association involved planting new palm trees in order to counteract the impact of
the disease. Unfortunately, L’Kasbat does not have the money necessary to constantly replace
newly planted trees if they succumb to al bayud. Ahmed claimed little knowledge regarding the
date wilt virus. He did not know how it spread or where it came from. Indeed, the types of
intervention being used such as cross breeding resistant palms were beyond the knowledge of
most Akkawis. This is the type of information not available in Tashelhait.
In addition, because all oasis agriculture is maintained through irrigation the oasis is also
susceptible to salinization; salt carried by river water from its mountain sources is deposited in
fields through irrigation.
Evaporation of water sitting on the surface in hot climates is rapid, concentrating the salts
in the remaining water that infiltrates through the soil to the underlying water
table…conditions of excessive irrigation bring the water table up to within 18 inches,
where capillary action brings it to the root zone and even to the surface, where the high
concentration of salts would kill most plants (Redman 1999, p. 129).
Historically, in southern Morocco, seasonal flooding of the major river systems allowed for what
Charles Redman (1999) refers to as “leaching the fields.” Flooding is, of course, fraught with
danger because along with the much needed water it also can destroy homes and take lives. Such
is the case in Akka, when a large section of the village of Tagadirt was destroyed by flood during
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the 1990s. Despite this, flood waters are essential for the maintenance of a healthy and
sustainable oasis ecosystem. They replenish the water table and feed springs. Oases suffer
without flood and because of the high occurrence of drought, flooding is sporadic.
On the surface, the precarious living conditions of the Akka oasis and the steady creep of
the desert indicate the need for the introduction of conservation policies as opposed to
agricultural extension. It was for this reason that NGOs were reluctant to invest money in
projects like Ahmed’s. Because human activity is believed to be the primary cause of
desertification and deforestation, investment in agricultural extension projects in environmentally
fragile areas like Akka would only contribute further to this decline. Development agencies are
therefore much more willing to contribute funding to projects like that of Bilal, a bicycle and
motorcycle repairman from the village of Agadir Ouzrou. Bilal was the head of his village’s
men’s association and similar to Ahmed, his primary concern was the health of the oasis and he
constantly explained to me that without the oasis there is nothing. However, contrary to their
counterparts in L’Kasbat, Bilal and his associates focused more on conservation and wanted to
cut back on use of the oasis outside of date farming. Specifically, this meant finding an
alternative place for village women to complete their daily washing. Women used the oasis river
and irrigation systems to clean their laundry and Bilal was concerned with the chemicals from
modern detergents such as Tide entering the soil and the water table. His association wanted to
build a wash house that did not empty dirty and soapy water back into the river and irrigation
system. This was a popular project idea that had been implemented in rural areas throughout
Morocco; however, many of the various incarnations and designs of this project often failed to
significantly change behavior or inhibit the continued use of already established water systems
for village laundry. Often the wash house failed to account for the amount of space and water
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needed to wash clothes and was not considered an efficient or viable alternative and often ended
up being abandoned. In addition, siphoning large amounts from the aquifer toward laundry may
not be the best use of an already scarce resource.

While the introduction of modern detergents

into the oasis ecosystem is probably not a good idea, there is no established link between the
possible decline in the overall “health” of the Akka oasis and women doing laundry in an
irrigation ditch. Women have always used the oasis water systems for laundry and the primary
reasons for environmental degradation, drought and disease, are unrelated to laundry.
Not coincidentally, none of the men in Agadir Ouzrou’s association were land owners
and generally worked in Akka as teachers or, as in Bilal’s case, as mechanics or shop keepers
and this perhaps explains the focus on conservation as opposed to Ahmed’s desire for
agricultural expansion. In addition, the sons of the wealthiest family in the village either worked
in industries in Casablanca or in the United States. More significantly, Bilal’s conservation
based goals coalesce nicely with those of the Moroccan government and outside non-government
organizations which tend to place the blame for environmental degradation at the feet of local
peasants like Ahmed. 36 To be sure, blaming local place holders for environmental degradation
and for the failure of various development programs has a long history within western
environmentalist movements and improvement projects such as Bilal’s appeal to this bias; a bias
often based on the belief in a dialogic relationship between pristine nature and destructive
humanity where nature is defined as the antithesis of civilization. The consequence of this
perspective is a modern environmental movement that allows no place for humans to make a
living off the land leading ultimately to the untenable tautology that the environment can only be
saved through the elimination of the human race. Cronon (1995) traces the development of this
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Indeed, it is definitely possible that the three previous Peace Corps volunteers, all of whom were based in Agadir
Ouzrou, had suggested this as a possibility for a community project.
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mode of thought by documenting the evolution of the “wilderness” myth from something
desolate and barren and avoided at all cost to the now common virgin, pristine image of nature
that currently dominates modern environmental movements. Cronon sagely points out that
nature is actually unnatural and hides its unnaturalness by appearing natural. Put simply, nature
is socially constructed. Cronon is particularly critical of the human versus non-human
dichotomy that it produces. Not only does it allow for the formation of the illogical emphasis on
the removal of human actions from so-called wilderness areas among environmental groups it
also allows us to avoid the environmental justice problems in places like Akka where humans
actually live.
Bruce Braun (2002) offers a similar argument to Cronon by stating that by focusing on
wilderness as being separate from culture we lose the truth of its social production and
subsequently are unable to proceed because nature everywhere is already marked by humans.
Consequently, environmental groups focus their attention on areas that best represent the
imagined “wilderness” and are unable to conceive of an environmentalism for all of those other
areas that are obviously marred by human interaction resulting in conflicts such as those between
international NGOs that want to limit human activity and local village associations who are
trying to survive off of the land. However, Braun is also critical of Cronon because he believes
Cronon does not take his understanding of the nature/culture dichotomy far enough. Cronon
recognizes that the pristine wilderness is a fixation that masks the history that has taken place to
produce a place such as Akka; however, Braun argues that there is no secure place of knowledge
that allows for an absolute truth regarding the state of the world. Any demystification of socially
constructed nature must be recognized as another consequence of culture and power and
therefore susceptible to becoming a new instrument of power.
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Scholarship regarding land use and cover change in the former colonized world indicates
the insidiousness of socially constructed nature in places like Akka. A thoroughly racialized
colonial discourse generally assumed pejorative views regarding native farming and forest
practices and colonial scientists subsequently established narratives of ecological degradation
based on these assumptions. This particular aspect of colonial policy was widespread and was
instituted throughout the colonial period no matter who the colonial power happened to be.
Blakie (1985) refers to the strong belief on the part of colonial administrators that third world
peasants and pastoralists were stupid and cognitively unable to properly manage the land.
Fairhead and Leach (1996) expose the dramatically poor understanding of local land use and
cover change in Guinea, West Africa. Isolated forest patches were automatically assumed to be
the remnants of a once vast forest that had been destroyed by indigenous land use practices;
however, in most instances, local land use dramatically increased the amount of secondary
growth forest. The authors make the rather obvious point that just because land is capable of
sustaining forest does not mean that forest existed on that land at some point in the past.
Although the more derogatory descriptions of local land use have declined, the belief that native
farmers and pastoralists are still primarily responsible for environmental problems such as soil
erosion and deforestation persists and colonial governments and their post-colonial counterparts
have utilized this belief as a blunt instrument to institute draconian land reforms that limit the
amount of land allocated to peasant farmers and pastoralists. These same restrictions were, of
course, never imposed on white European settlers despite their clear cutting forests for
agricultural expansion.
Diana Davis (2007) interrogates this phenomenon in North Africa and takes on the wellestablished, indeed ubiquitous, narrative regarding land use practices among Maghrebi-s in
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Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco which states that poor land husbandry on the part of native
farmers and pastoralists decimated a once abundant countryside. Davis argues that the
environmental narrative regarding agricultural possibilities in North Africa are, in reality, part of
a well-crafted piece of French colonial fantasy constructed for the primary purpose of
disenfranchising the native inhabitants of the Maghreb. She begins by providing paleoecological data regarding the climate of North Africa over the past several thousand years which
indicates that North Africa has always been extremely arid with unpredictable precipitation
patterns. Subsequently, by engaging in limited sedentary agriculture and focusing primarily on
pastoralism, the Arab and Berber tribes were well adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the climate.
However, the French colonial apparatus, using the classical writings of Greek and Roman
authors, many of whom never actually traveled to North Africa, in addition to selecting certain
aspects of prominent Arab historians such as Ibn Khaldoun and Leo Africanus, created a
narrative of declension in which natives decimated a once fertile landscape that provided the
grain for the entire Roman Empire. In a statement that epitomized the mindset of colonial
officials, Jean Colin taught recruits in the Indigenous Affairs Office that “France is the legitimate
successor of Rome…the great Roman people of whom we are the heirs conquered this region
well before the Arabs. Like Rome we will again expand the cultivable area and transform it into
fertile plains” (Davis 2007, p. 5). Because Arab tribesmen were imagined to be poor
environmental stewards, the French were therefore morally obligated to intervene and
demonstrate proper land husbandry and many of the laws developed to expropriate land were
enacted under the auspices of rescuing the land from the Arabs. 37 Of course, inherent in the
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The actual reasons for France’s occupation of the Maghreb are far less honorable. France incurred a large debt to
Algeria during the Napoleonic Wars during Napoleon’s military escapades in Egypt. Thirty years later, Algeria
attempted to call in its debt which ultimately resulted in a diplomatic row that served as an excuse for the French to
invade Algeria and flex its imperial muscles. For more see Davis 2007.
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creation of the Roman myth is the belief that the non-European “other,” is a lesser form of
human being incapable of advanced civilization and it is extremely likely that the French would
have developed some other excuse to dominate Moroccans and Algerians. Notwithstanding their
belief in their advanced farming techniques, the greatest rate of deforestation occurred between
the years of 1890 and 1940, the high point of the French colonies in Morocco and Algeria.
The most prominent aspect of the declension narrative involved deforestation. Europeans
were obsessed with forests and over the several decades following colonization the forest service
turned into one of the primary tools with which to police Moroccan and Algerian nationals. 38
The French created an incredibly onerous forest protection law that gave enormous power to
forest rangers to regulate the behavior of their colonial subjects. French forest rangers placed
significant restrictions on native pastoralists and trans-humants forcing many to abandon their
herds. For example, many areas defined as “forests” were, in reality, brush and scrub well suited
for grazing and often completely devoid of trees (Davis 2007, p. 83).

By limiting access to

quality grazing land the French were able to sedentarized nomadic populations. Ultimately,
territorialized populations were easier to police than nomads living by their own rules in the
desert.
Despite the fact that the declension narrative was based on poor evidence and generally
made out of whole cloth and that a majority of negative environmental transformations took
place during the colonial period as a direct result of colonial actions, it became established as the
de facto environmental history of the Maghreb by the end of the colonial period in 1956 (Davis
2007). Convinced of their inherent superiority, the French instituted large scale capitalist
farming methods that resulted in the increased use of marginal lands (land that receives little to
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In Algeria, the French also utilized this narrative to stoke conflict between Arabs and Berbers as well and defined
Berbers as living in greater harmony with the land.

49

no annual rainfall), the reduction or outright elimination of fallow periods as well as mechanized
plows that ultimately resulted in the desiccation and erosion of the soil. Furthermore, French
farmers also relied heavily on irrigation and large dam construction that contributed to the
depletion of ground water and increased salinization of the soil. Regrettably, the post-colonial
government has pursued the same agricultural policies as their colonial predecessors.
[The declension narrative] has been embedded in numerous important and influential
publications, including the forestry manuals, histories, botanical, and agricultural
treatises, and geographical and ecological studies. Many of those authoritative colonial
works continue to be read widely…and thus have laid the foundation for a great deal of
subsequent education, research and policy formation (Davis 2007, p. 169).
For example, the post-colonial government constructed two large dams, El Mansour at the head
of the Drâa River Valley near Ouarzazate and Hassan Addakhil at the head of the Ziz River
Valley south of Rich in Er-Rachidia Province. The dams were built for the dual purposes of
controlling the catastrophic floods that devastate the oases of the Ziz and the Drâa River Valleys
as well as collecting water for use during extended dry periods. It has failed on both counts in
that it has not prevented all floods and there is never enough rainfall to collect water for later use.
As noted earlier, flooding, though at times catastrophic, is necessary for the survival of oases life
and Ilahiane (2004) argues that water collected by the dam, although limited, is water that can no
longer be utilized by oasis farmers thus creating another area of contention between Agricultural
Ministry officials and local oasis dwellers. In addition, the government has pursued an
agricultural policy developed to help support industrial growth in its major cities. This particular
strategy is also born from the declension myth established by the French and was initially
implemented in an effort to promote France’s own industrial growth. Except that Morocco’s
actual ecological history indicates that it is not capable of a sustainable large scale agricultural
economy. Indeed, this policy has instead resulted in an increase in drought hazard and a general
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decline in Morocco’s ability to be self-sufficient with regard to grain and cereal production and a
series of subsequent food crises.
This narrative of environmental decline and desertification in areas such as Akka, Zagora
and Tafilalet is so entrenched and ubiquitous that it dominates the contemporary policy debates
regarding current environmental problems. The notion that local agricultural practices are
especially adapted to local climate conditions impact is often disregarded when developing all
manner of interventions implemented in the name of long term sustainability. Bilal’s project is
but one example of the type of work sponsored by NGOs located in southern Morocco that stress
conservation through the use of fuel efficient ovens and water security. Although these are
quality projects, the language used to market them as necessary is that of crisis. Similar to global
environmental concerns, deforestation, desertification and ultimate oasis annihilation are
presented as inevitable if proper agricultural and environmental practices are not implemented.
More significantly, these apocalyptic outcomes are perceived as a direct result of local practices
as opposed to global climate change, macro level national agricultural strategy or simply as part
of a regular drought cycle. In reality, there has been no long term research into the relative
“health” of the Akka oasis because the environmental declension narrative is so thoroughly
integrated and is generally assumed as a given with the notable exception being the opinions of
villagers such as Ahmed who believe in the possibility of extending agricultural practices. 39
Furthermore, these “improvement programs” deliberately ignore the political-economic and
social processes that originally marginalized the populations that the programs are designed to
help. Tania Li Murray describes it thusly:
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As noted earlier, most NGOs were unwilling to invest in Ahmed’s oasis reclamation project because of their belief
that previous agricultural practices had overextended the limits of the oasis resulting in the current state of erosion
overlooking the possibility that villagers had abandoned farming because of opportunities elsewhere, e.g. jobs in the
north, or that the oasis is mired in a regular drought cycle.
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Although the design studies clearly identified processes such as increasing landlessness,
impoverishment, debt accumulation…and practices such as corruption, illegal logging,
stealing with impunity, incompetent planning…much of this knowledge was excluded (Li
2007, p. 154).
NGOs often exacerbate this failure by consigning the poorest and most marginalized people to
the least profitable development alternatives. The elephant in the room that NGOs and aid
agencies are avoiding is the seemingly blatant contradictions of capitalism. Indeed, if there is an
actual solution to the problems of these marginalized communities it will probably require a total
realignment of global economic prerogatives including a return to subsistence based agriculture
as opposed to the current dependence on the cash crops.
The actual environmental reality is that northwest Africa is particularly susceptible to
drought. According to Will Swearingen (1996), since the beginning of the French Protectorate in
1912, Morocco has experienced 27 years of agricultural drought. Drought is also not just a
modern phenomenon as Morocco has endured 49 major drought related famines since the arrival
of the Arabs in the seventh century (Swearingen 1996, p. 23). Furthermore, even when Morocco
does not suffer significant drought conditions, farmers face precipitation patterns that do not
actually display any remarkable pattern. According to Lawrence Rosen, between the years 1956
to 1958 in the region of Sefrou just south of Fez in the North of Morocco, there was an annual
average rainfall of 55.6 millimeters in October, the primary planting season. However, in
October 1956 there was only 7 millimeters of rain while in the following year there was 105
millimeters of rain (Rosen 1979, p. 10). The erratic rainfall of Northwest Africa was
demonstrated more recently in 1988 when Morocco enjoyed its largest ever cereals harvest while
Tunisia, its neighbor to the northeast, endured drought related crop failures and food shortages
(Swearingen 1996, p. 20). According to Clifford Geertz, “not only is year-to-year variation in
rainfall enormous, but also is the within year shape of it. To be a weatherman
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in…Morocco…you need to be able to penetrate the mind of God (Geertz 2008, p. 191).
Unfortunately, the drought hazards experienced in the Maghreb are becoming more common and
there is a concern that drought will increase as a result of global climate change. Climate change
models indicate that drought hazards in Northwest Africa will increase as a result of global
warming. 40 One particular model estimated a decline in precipitation by as much as 10 percent
(Swearingen 1996, p. 17). During my two and half year stay in Akka, there was a total of three
days of rain. 41
Ironically, despite the concerns of climate change, most of the drought hazards
experienced by Morocco have been the result of a schizophrenic development strategy
implemented by the Moroccan government. Following independence the Moroccan government
kept prices for its staple food crops artificially low. The rationale was that cheap food would
allow for wages to be kept low thereby promoting urban industrial growth. However, an
unintended effect of these price controls was that low crop prices acted as a deterrent to cereal
farmers, resulting in declines in production and increased indebtedness because Morocco had to
borrow money in order to purchase foreign produced cereal crops (Swearingen 1996, p. 27).
Following a series of riots resulting from food shortages in the early 1980s, the government
shifted gears and artificially raised cereal crop prices to twice the world market price in order to
boost production and become more agriculturally self-sufficient. This prompted a dramatic
increase in overall yields from 3.8 million tons in 1984 to 6.6 million tons by 1991. It also
resulted in an increase in the overall land used for cereal production from 4.4 million hectares to
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The three days it did rain resulted in significant flooding that cut off travel in and out of the village for several
days in the spring of 2002. The river, which had always been a sea of stones, literally became a raging torrent. The
flood produced a small celebration as everyone gathered on the river’s edge and watched the water rush past. It also
marked an end to a long drought period and the possibility of a better harvest later that spring.
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5.4 million hectares. However, the increased yields did not come without a cost. The high
prices promoted the cultivation of marginal farmlands prone to desertification and the reduction
of fields left in fallow, leaving Morocco even more vulnerable to drought. Consequently, the
1992 harvest, one year following a record 1991 harvest, was the worst in a decade (Swearingen
1996).
This combination of environmental constraints imposed by the desert and a lack of a
sustainable rural development strategy makes migration from rural areas such as Akka an
economic imperative as there are simply not enough economic opportunities available via
agriculture, small business or government to survive without leaving the village. Rural areas
dominated by Berber speakers in the High Atlas Mountains and the southern pre-Saharan
provinces feel these effects more than other regions and demonstrate the highest levels of
poverty. Among the rural population, 63 percent have no water, 87 percent are without
electricity, 93 percent have no access to health services and 65 percent are illiterate (Crawford
2005). Dale Eickelmann suggests that the poverty in rural areas is exacerbating rural-urban
migration resulting in the creation of shanty towns commonly referred to as bidonvilles in and
around cities such as Casablanca, Salé and Rabat (Knauss 1990, p. 436). People prefer the
squalor of urban slums than the economic desperation which prevails in the countryside. There
are additional studies which suggest that the poorest tend to migrate less than those who are
slightly better off. People do not necessarily migrate to flee economic deprivation but because of
the belief that they can find a better or more stable livelihood (de Haas 2007, p. 18). The desire
to migrate is dependent upon an individual’s ever-changing aspirations. Aspirations, according
to Hein de Haas, “are typically not constant, but tend to increase with ‘developmental’
improvements in education and access to information (de Haas 2007, p. 18). In other words,
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rural development and the access to information now available because of globalization have
intensified the desire for migration.
This seems to apply to international as well as internal migration. Rural development and
infrastructure programmes – such as the proverbial road construction project – can have
the contradictory effect of stimulating migration…In this light it is not surprising that the
attempts by…development NGOs and governments to stop the rural exodus…typically
fail, or even have the opposite effect (de Haas 2007, p. 19).
If the economic opportunities of “sending communities” do not increase at a greater rate than the
economic aspirations of its residents, then significant migration will continue because people
will believe they can achieve a better life elsewhere, even if that reality does not actually exist
(de Haas 2007, p. 19). De Haas’ research lends credence to earlier scholarship which suggested
that infrastructure improvements initiated by the French and subsequently maintained and further
promoted by the post-colonial government created an economic environment that allowed for
migration to be considered a viable option for economic survival. It is this variable that
compelled Ahmed’s son Brahim to find his future in Guilmim as opposed to the limited
economic opportunities provided by NGO development projects.
The convergence of all these factors has produced a dramatic demographic shift in
Moroccan society. The migration of Berbers and Haratin from Akka is part of a much larger
trend of urbanization that began with Morocco’s independence from France. In 1956, the rural
population of Morocco measured 71 percent of the overall population. Beginning in 1960 the
percentage of the rural population in comparison to the overall population began to decline so
that as of 2006, the rural population measured only 41 percent of the total population. In fact,
since 2000, the rural population has begun to decline in actual numbers as it has demonstrated a
negative growth rate of one to two percent. Contrast this with Moroccan cities which have
displayed a growth rate of almost four to five percent since 1960 (World Development Indicators
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Online 2007). This transition from a predominately rural population to a predominately urban
one is also supported by the growth in the non-agricultural sectors of the Moroccan economy.
While overall agricultural employment has declined to 43.1 percent from 78.1 percent in 1960,
employment in jobs consistent with increased urbanization such as construction, industry,
communications, transport and services has grown (Sabagh 1993, p. 32).
How do these macro-level factors impact the residents of the Akka oasis? How have the
shifting dynamics of Morocco’s efforts toward modernization as well as its attempts to reconcile
itself with its colonial past coalesce to produce the complex cultural system that is Akka. In the
following section I will begin to delineate how these larger processes have altered the landscape
in Akka.
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Cultural Consequences
After the war with the Polisario ended in the 1980s, the Moroccan government finally
invested in the single lane paved road which now connects Tata Province with the rest of
Morocco. 42 Although the road was sometimes closed as a result of flooding it provided safe and
convenient access to the world and contributed further to the migratory push. 43 When I arrived in
Akka, there were two daily buses which went to Rabat and Casablanca and a third bus that went
to Ouarzazate where it was possible to find buses to cities such as Fez and Er Rachidia. One of
the more entrepreneurial companies, a Tata based firm named El-Bani, owned the route from
Ouarzazate to Tan Tan and was able to open up a third route from Tata to Marrakesh. There
were so many regular routes that Ahmed’s son Brahim was able to return home every weekend
with relative ease and migrants from further afield in the cities of Fez and Tangier did not have
to spend so many months away from home. Regular transport combined with the introduction of
modern telecommunications allowed Ahmed to manage his family’s business in Fez and still
spend a majority of his time in L’Kasbat. And for all of his talk about wanting to see the world,
Brahim was still a regular at his family’s dinner table.
The busiest travel days were those surrounding the main Moroccan holidays, Aid al’Kbir
and Aid al’Sghir, literally the big and little Aids. Aid al’Sghir is the festival marking the end of
Ramadan and Aid al’Kbir was the Moroccan Arabic neologism for the feast of Abraham which
falls after the Hajj, the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca. Aid al Kbir falls approximately ninety days
after the end of Ramadan. On these days, everyone travels home for a week to spend time with
family and reconnect with their friends. For young men and women it also is a time to meet and
42

The Polisario is a Spanish acronym that stands for Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de
Oro. They were Saharawi rebels fighting for independence for the Western Sahara, a territory currently occupied by
Morocco. They are currently under a U.N. monitored ceasefire awaiting a referendum to decide whether or not to
remain a part of Morocco or become independent.
43
Although seemingly mundane, the importance of safety should not be overlooked. Southeast Morocco was, for
centuries, rocked by instability and banditry.
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set the stage for possible marriage. A Moroccan friend of mine who works in Chicago budgets
his time and money so that he can return home for the end of Ramadan and stay long enough to
attend Aid al Kbir festivities. Travel during these two weeks of the year is incredibly difficult
and bus stations and train stations throughout the country are absolutely mobbed and even tickets
to an out of the way place such as Tata province are difficult to find. 44 This effort to get home is
also displayed during other times of the year. My Moroccan counterparts in the dispensaire in
L’Kasbat spent their yearly holiday at home. Indeed, one of them spent his summer holiday in
his home near Zagora, one of the few places in Morocco that is actually hotter than Tata
Province in the summer time.
During my first Aid al’ Kbir in Morocco I spent the afternoon with Ahmed and his
family. His family had swelled to three times its normal size as I was introduced to brothers,
uncles and cousins who had been in Fez and Marrakesh since the previous Aid al’Kbir. It was a
momentous occasion and everyone in the village seemed to have a spring in their step as they
travelled from house to house greeting people they had not seen in the past year. At one point
during the feast the conversation inevitably turned toward comparisons between Morocco and
the United States and Ahmed asked me if we had anything similar in the United States. The
analogy my Moroccan supervisors always used to explain the significance and fanfare of their
holidays was to compare it to Thanksgiving and Christmas in the United States. 45 In terms of the
amount of people on the roads attempting to get home the analogy was suitable; however, it did
not quite capture the true essence of Aid al’Kbir and Aid al’Sghir because the effort made by
44

I made the mistake of travelling during Aid-al-Kbir. I fought with thousands of other Moroccans in the main bus
station of Casablanca trying to find a ticket for Agadir, the closest major city to Tata. All tickets for buses directly
to Tata had been sold out.
45
This comparison was particularly appropriate during my service in Morocco because both years Ramadan fell in
December and Aid al’Sghir coincided with Christmas. Ever the capitalists, Coca Cola issued special Ramadan
editions of their bottles that share a remarkable resemblance to their special Holiday bottles from Europe and the
United States
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Akkawis to make their way home and the joy they felt in being there epitomized the Moroccan
sense of place and rootedness.
Traditionally the anthropological understanding of space has always been rooted in
images of barriers and borders and often takes on the appearance of a map or globe that neatly
delineates one nation or culture from another. Furthermore, the cultures and nations of the world
are conceived of in the plural because we conceive them as divided and separate from one
another. Subsequently, as Malkki points out, “[T]he conceptual practice of spatial segmentation
is not only reflected in narratives of “cultural diversity” but also in the international celebration
of diversity” (Malkki 1997 p. 58). Eric Wolf (1982) used the metaphor of the billiard table to
offer criticism of this perspective suggesting that anthropologists view the world as a billiard
table with the differently colored balls representing the various cultures of the world constantly
bouncing off one another. It is because of this segmentation that the use of de Crèvecœur’s
metaphor of the melting pot to describe the United States has been replaced by that of the tossed
salad. Each individual vegetable maintains its own identity despite being part of a larger whole.
Related to the spatial discontinuity of peoples and cultures is the more abstract idea that
nations and cultures are rooted in the land. The metaphorical connection between place and
space has long been a standard part of nationalist discourse and in global hotspots such as
Kosovo, Palestine and the Western Sahara place becomes an essential part of culture and
nationhood.
Culture and nation are kindred concepts: they are not only spatializing but also
territorializing; they both depend on a cultural essentialism that readily takes on
arborescent forms (Malkki 1997, p. 58).
The territorialization of culture has also been a key component of ethnography because
anthropologists have the tendency to tie people to places with the designation of terms such as
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indigenous, autochthonous and native. Arjun Appadurai refers to this as the “incarceration” of
the native (Appadurai 1988, p. 37). Natives are people who are from and belong to certain
places. The anthropologist or the traveler never refers to himself or herself as native, even in
their own homes, because the term native implies confinement while the anthropologist is free to
move.
The incarceration of the native also takes on an ecological bent as natives are depicted as
being specifically adapted to an environment that confines them to their place. Frederic Barth
(2008) used the concept of an ecological niche to describe ethnic relations in the Swat Valley in
Pakistan. Each ethnic group filled a particular ecological niche that was capable of sustaining
each group’s social and political organization. Barth did account for movement across ethnic
boundaries within the Swat Valley but argued that the nature of the social hierarchy between the
three groups inhibited significant movement. Julian Steward utilized his theory of cultural
ecology and levels of socio-cultural integration to testify on behalf of the U.S. government in
front of the Indiana Claims Commission. In court he argued that the environment in which they
lived prevented the Shoshone from integrating at anything above the basic family unit.
Steward essentially condemned the Uintah Ute to forage the perilous lands of the Great Basin
forever. In many instances, the incarceration of the native is done with the best intentions. For
example, the Kayapo fight for land tenure rights over their traditional homeland in Amazonia
became an international cause célèbre because they were viewed as the guardians of the
rainforest who needed to be protected in order to help save the Earth. Their indigeneity became
valorized to such a point that any attempt to break through this barrier was viewed as a betrayal
of the planet (Conklin and Graham 1995).
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In the Moroccan context, the effort on the part of the French to divide Morocco between
Arab and Berbers was natural because it fit nicely with the traditional understanding of the world
that was full of nice, distinct boundaries. There are many maps of Morocco that demarcate the
space between Arab and Berber speakers. These generally take on the guise of amorphously
shaped amoebas overlaid onto images of Morocco and North Africa delineating specifically
where Berber and Arabic are spoken. Furthermore, Malkki’s critique illustrating the tendency of
cultural descriptions to take on “aborescent form” holds true as Moroccan anthropological
discourse as often depicted Berbers as being constant and rooted to place. The Protectorate
discourse described Berbers as “France’s sequoias,” deeply entrenched in their territories
(Hoffman 2008, p 25) while others have characterized Berbers as a constant, “like the palms in
the oasis and the sands of the desert” (Brett and Fentress 1997, p. 6-7). Of course, part of this is
due to the fact that history has been written around the events of the invaders be they French,
Arab or Roman while the Berbers remain mere witnesses to history, a remarkable feat
considering that several of the great Moorish dynasties of al-Andalusia were Berber in origin. 46
But anthropologists such as Gellner also contributed to this mindset by arguing that Berber
society is “segmentary and premodern and thus isolated from the Moroccan state and nation”
(Crawford 2006, p. 178).

For the Haratin, the historical confinement to place has been even

more complete as their existence has been interlinked with that of Ismkhan despite the fact they
have been present in Moroccan society since at least before the Arab invasion. They have
literally been a people without history imprisoned by the desert and their place within the social
hierarchy.
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Although I referenced this point earlier I want to reiterate the efforts by chroniclers and historians to incorporate
the Berbers into the genealogy of Islam. It was only recently that the national government in Rabat officially
recognized them as the indigenous people of North Africa with the establishment of IRCAM.
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The return of Ahmed’s entire family and indeed, the return of almost all of the sons of the
village suggest the historical incarceration of Berbers and Haratin to their traditional homeland is
no longer applicable if it ever was. Migration resulting from environmental constraints and
emerging economic opportunities in the north has resulted in several consequences for the
process of ethnicization. First, men who relocate their families to the cities retain their Berber
speech; however, they have historically not made the effort to pass Berber speech on to
successive generations, a fact recognized by Gellner. Because Berberness has been so
intertwined with language, the inability to speak Berber or the failure to pass on Berber to
successive generations translates to their children no longer being Berber. For example, an
Akkawi family living in France returned for the holiday. The father relocated with his wife and
children and his son did not speak Tashelhait; he spoke only French and identified himself as a
Frenchman from Marseilles. I met another husband and wife who came from different
backgrounds in that he was Ashelhi and she was Tamazight. Their children grew up speaking
Arabic as a compromise. When I questioned them about the loss of their Berberness, they were
not overly concerned and echoed Ahmed’s point about the actual value of speaking Berber. The
process of cultural reproduction, or, in this case, cultural transformation is not always this
smooth and will often result in fractured family relationships, most often between parents and
children. The discord between first and second generation immigrants is well documented both
here in the United States and Europe. The Berber couple was from the city of Ouarzazate and
did not have the same antagonistic relationship with Arabs that rural Berber migrants did. For a
Haratin like Hajj Ahmed, in addition to the fact that Berber had little value in the linguistic
marketplace, the essentialized Berber culture that has developed since independence in response
to the Arab nationalist movement was not his own. Indeed, Berberness maintained a somewhat
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negative connotation because it was representative of something that had historically denied him
al-asl.
For Akkawi Berbers, however, the possible loss of their language and the movement
away from the tamazirt is a growing concern. 47 Hoffman (2008) delineates the laundry list of
concerns for Ashelhi regarding the future of their language. Young Ashelhi men working in the
cities prefer to speak Arabic; writing Tashelhait seems impossible; Ishalhin from different areas
have no solidarity around being Ashelhi and the national curriculum, until very recently,
prohibited teaching in Tashelhait (Hoffman 2008, p. 55). Part of the response to the fear of
losing their language and cultural heritage has been the fashioning of a national and, at times,
international Berber movement organized around language and the experience of being Berber
and speaking Berber in relation to Arabic speakers. The movement is not directly tied in with
any specific place and, in this sense, is imaginary, “structured not only by a common heritage,
origin, and, language, but also by similar structural positions relative…to those in positions of
authority” (Hoffman 2008, p. 58). Logistically, however, this attempt toward a cohesive
Moroccan Berber identity runs into serious problems because what it means to be Berber is
different based on place. There is no real cohesive material for Berber nationalism beyond the
fact they are not Arab and not everyone experiences “Berber” in relation to the “other.” In this
instance the role of “other” is played by Arab speakers. There is also the inconvenient fact that
there are three distinct Berber languages spoken in Morocco.
For Berber migrants, the city has become a metaphor for all things Arab and is
representative of the breakdown of Berber communities because everyone is looking out for their
individual interests. “In the rural father’s view…the community was visible, tangible, face-to-

47

Tamazirt (pl. timizar) is the Berber word for homeland, place and countryside. Also, this word should not be
confused with Tamazight, the Berber dialect spoken in the High Atlas Mountains, the Middle Atlas and the Tafilalt.
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face, and performed; its members were in contact, under constant scrutiny, and this contact
strengthened networks of interest” (Hoffman 2008, p. 55). For Hoffman’s informants,
community required shared overlapping interests that bounded people together. In this manner
the Berber notion of the tamazirt becomes significant in what it means to be Berber and the
maintenance of the tamazirt becomes critical in perpetuating Berberness, particularly Tashelhait.
Indeed, the tamazirt has been objectified to such a degree that in many places it has become the
symbol par excellence of what it means to be Berber.
Amazigh activists in Morocco and abroad, as well as Radio Agadir programming in
Tashelhait, presented and represented the Tashelhait-speaking community to itself and to
Arab Moroccan, drawing heavily on images and sounds from the countryside to do so
and erasing distinctions between individual villages (Hoffman 2002, p. 940).
The tamazirt stands in stark contrast to the cities which are dominated by the linguistic and
cultural hegemony of the Arab majority. The tamazirt is the single place where there is no
disadvantage to being a Berber and it is the Berber speaking man’s attachment to his tamazirt
which makes the linguistic assimilation into the Arab majority less certain (Hoffman 2008).
The physical manifestation of this emotional attachment in the tamazirt can be seen both
in the yearly migration for the holidays as well as in the manner migrants invest their money
earned while working in the north. In addition to donating time and money to the village
associations similar to Ahmed’s, Akkawi Berbers have also indulged in consumption patterns in
line with those of the west and will often invest in large homes for their families or small
businesses such as cafes or hanout-s. The village is under constant construction as old mud
walls are slowly replaced with cement, satellite dishes are added on to people’s rooftops and new
houses were springing up in the few remaining open areas. Many families will begin
construction even if they do not have enough money to complete the project for many years.
New constructions sit unfinished until enough money is saved in order to begin again.
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However, the consequence of the objectification and valorization of the tamazirt as
necessary for the maintenance of the Berber language is that Amazigh women and girls become
responsible for transmitting the Berber language onto younger generations. Because of the
linguistic hegemony of Moroccan Arabic, outsiders no longer take the time to learn Tamazight
and it is very rare that a native Arabic speaker becomes a Tashelhait dominant speaker as an
adult. In addition, migrant men will generally speak Moroccan Arabic when they are abroad and
it is often the case that the children of Tamazight speaking parents who live in urban areas do not
continue to speak Tamazight. Thus, Berber women have become the sole repository for the
maintenance of the Berber language. More importantly, despite their significant position, these
women do not take part in the broader discourse on Berber identity. Because they only speak
with other monolingual Berber speakers, women are not compelled to articulate a particular
Berber identity distinct from their Arab countrymen. Given the extremely difficult nature of life
in rural areas and the strong correlation between the Berber language and the tamazirt, the
question remains whether or not speaking Berber or even being Berber is important to rural
women. For these women, the tamazirt is identified with the labor of tilling the fields, raising
children and managing the household. Most of them long to move away from the hard life of the
countryside and live with their husbands and sons in the big cities in the north (Hoffman 2008).
The conflation of the tamazirt with Berberness also contributes to the continued
marginalization of Berbers in broader Moroccan society. Despite the fact that large percentages
of Berber speakers live and work in cities and have participated in government, Berberness
continues to be constructed as equivalent to the backwardness of the countryside in the public
sphere. Following independence, Arab elites assumed the places left vacant by the French and
rural areas occupied primarily by Berber speakers and Haratin were consigned to the space of the

65

pre-modern other. Despite the effort to fix their villages with the accoutrements of modernity,
essentializing the rural tamazirt as the ultimate symbol of what it means to be Berber makes it
difficult to argue that Berbers are able to be both Berber as well as modern citizens capable of
participation in the Moroccan public sphere. The stereotype of Berbers as backward is
perpetuated and the blame for the failure of alleviating rural poverty is shifted onto Berber
communities. Berbers become responsible for their poverty. Social inequalities such as the lack
of access to schools and health care are explained away as something intrinsic to the ignorance
and superstition of rural Berber culture and Arabs are able to maintain the hegemony over the
definition of modernity in Morocco they have held since independence.
Similar to Berbers, Haratin families like Ahmed’s are equally invested in the long term
health of the tamazirt. However, because they are not invested in the stability of a status quo that
left them marginalized, the Haratin have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by the
attempts toward industrial development made by both the French colonial government and the
post-colonial government in Rabat and invested their remittances into land acquisition and
farming intensification despite the lack of any real economic return. Instead,
[a]ccess to land "breeds'' empowerment, identity, roots, and origin, al-asl. Without land
one has no rights to speak of, and one is “like a walking donkey,” and “your value or
qimtak is not even zero in the eyes of the community” (Ilahiane 2001, p. 384).
The Haratin are buying al-asl. In addition, Haratin are also purchasing water pumps to avoid
participating in the legal hassle of the division of water for irrigation. This effort to subvert
traditional oasis society has also been reinforced by the establishment of corporate communities
on the part of Haratin. In the Ziz oasis, this is represented by the organization of a burial fund in
certain villages so that individual Haratin do not die in debt and leave their children at the mercy
of their Arab and Berber patrons. In Akka it takes the form of village associations like Ahmed’s
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that are organized to try and overcome some of the village wide problems. As noted earlier, a
majority of the projects are geared toward maintenance of the common property areas of the
oasis such as planting new palm trees to replace those destroyed by al-bayud. They also use
their funds to purchase school supplies for village children.
The development of Haratin corporate communities in Morocco to confront village wide
problems is a dramatic change because historically, the access to public resources was governed
by a complex code of laws to ensure access and prevent private owners from exceeding their
water quota. In his short essay regarding the allocation of water for irrigation in Morocco,
Geertz points out that although people “draw upon common water resources, they do so in a way
about as far from the public corporation…as it is possible to get and still not fall into Hobbsean
war” (Geertz 2008,, p. 196). Peasant corporate communities are a subject that has received
considerable attention within environmental anthropology because local actors can have a
significant impact on land use and cover change. Eric Wolf (1957) argued that corporate
communities are developed primarily as a defense mechanism against external threats or internal
domination by elites. In the sense that some Haratin are organizing against their traditional local
oppressors, Wolf’s theory holds true to form. However, these corporate communities are limited
in their scope in that they do not extend beyond the boundaries of each individual village. In
Akka, each association is focused on the needs of their particular village and is disinclined to
establish an inter-village association to address oasis wide issues. Nor is there a broader
Moroccan wide notion of being Haratin or Haratin-ness. In addition, unlike the traditional
homeland of the Kayapó, Akka is not contested space in the traditional sense. Although Haratin
are challenging Berber hegemony in the tamazirt, Akkawis do not have to defend their land
tenure rights against large multi-national corporations or a national government intent on
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developing their land for the benefit of international markets. Although the activities of village
associations are closely monitored by the national government--represented locally by the
gendarmerie--and the legal restrictions regarding why an association can be formed are rather
onerous, peasant corporations are not organized to challenge the legitimacy of the government in
Morocco. Sheridan (1997) also illustrates the point that Wolf often overlooks the impact of local
ecological and demographic factors. In this particular instance, the localized construction of a
Haratin identity and its subsequent representation in the form of village associations, heretofore
non-existent, was a result of political and ecological factors completely outside of their control:
the access to jobs in areas such as construction and the decline in value of small-plot farms
resulting from both ecological decline and colonial and post-colonial development schemes.
Sheridan’s theoretical stance is similar to that of Robert Netting (1976) who suggested that longstanding corporate ownership was more indicative of environmental adaptation than a response
to external forces.
The purchase of al-asl on the part of the Haratin has not gone unchallenged by their
Berber neighbors. The acquisition of land and the subsequent expansion of political power is
perceived as a threat to a Berber culture already marginalized by a government policy of
Arabization because despite the many cultural traits, including language, shared by Berbers and
Haratin, Haratin view the cultural Berber movement with suspicion.
Iqbliyin 48 living in semi-urban areas where Amazigh activism is particularly present feel
excluded from the social and economic promotion opened by Berber politics, being
under-represented within the membership of IRCAM, the leadership of Amazigh cultural
associations, and the ranks of journalists and other engaged Berber intellectuals now
living in Rabat and abroad (Silverstein 2010, p. 92).
This fact is demonstrated by Ahmed’s reticence in pushing for broader Berber rights in our
discussions regarding the needs of the village. This reluctance is fueled further by a
48

As noted in the introduction, Iqbliyin is another term for Haratin.
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rearticulation of racist language on the part of Berber activists that suggests that the expansion of
Haratin political rights marks the “death” of Berber culture. Berber activists have organized
large scale protests against the transfer of “Berber” land to “Black” Haratin merchants for this
reason. And although there has never been overt violence between Berbers and Haratin in Akka,
tensions boiled over into open conflict in Er-Rachidia in 2003 when several Berber student
activists were knifed for refusing to participate in a pro-Palestinian rally. Their refusal was
based on their belief that support for the Palestinians represented another example of Arabic
nationalist hegemony similar to that taking place in Morocco. However, because the perpetrators
were Haratin, the incident was perceived as more closely related to political disagreements
between local Haratin and Berbers than the broader issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
(Silverstein 2010).
For Akkawi Arabs, the ecological problems of the oasis and the preservation of the
tamazirt are not of immediate concern because their identity as Arabs is secure regardless of the
health of the oasis. The oasis does not maintain the same level of symbolic capital for Arab
speaking Akkawis, and it has little impact on their daily life aside from providing water and an
occasional walk to clear your mind. Subsequently, village associations are more concerned with
obtaining books and computers for school children as opposed to focusing on planting trees or
preventing women from doing laundry in the river. Nor does the increased marginalization of
the Berber culture and language or the outright refusal to recognize the contributions of Berbers
as intrinsically Berber carry any broader significance for Arab speaking Akkawis. Indeed, until
2001, it was officially government policy to deny the existence of Berbers as a unique cultural
group. In addition, the Arab speaking villages of Ait Anter, Akka and El Kebebat are unable to
practice any level of subsistence agriculture. Because of environmental degradation these
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villages are no longer connected to the oasis. Similar to the land near L’Kasbat, there is a large
swath of abandoned land measuring approximately 200m² directly north of Akka that separates
the Arab communities from the oasis. This patch of desert is also littered with the crumbling
remains of mud walls that at one point demarcated individual farming plots and irrigation
ditches. There are a few families with the wherewithal to invest in mechanized water pumps and
subsequently engage in some level of small scale agriculture but this is done more as a symbol of
status than one of need. Consequently, Arab speaking villages stand in stark contrast with their
Berber and Haratin neighbors. The buildings of Ait Anter, Al Kebebat and Akka are built with
cement and cinderblocks as opposed to mud which dominates in the Berber villages. 49 Homes in
the Arab dominated areas of Akka are all equipped with running water. Although some of the
wealthier Berber families have running water, most still depend on wells dug by hand. Arab
children will often finish high school, leave for university and attempt to find a job within the
civil service or establish their own small business. Even Arab girls are generally allowed to
finish high and many will attend the teachers college in Tata after graduation. 50 Berber speaking
girls often stop after primary school. Furthermore, because the junior high school and high
school are located in Akka center, many Berber speaking boys do not continue beyond primary
school.
Many of the contrasts between Arab and Berber villages are indicative of the status of
Arabs as modern Moroccan citizens. Unlike Berbers and Haratin, they have access to the basic
utilities and amenities that we associate with modernity, a consequence of the marginalization of
Berbers following independence and the historic marginalization of Black Moroccans. During
49

As noted earlier, this has begun to change somewhat because money from remittances is used to build houses out
of brick and mortar as opposed to mud. However, a majority of buildings are still built with mud.
50
The teachers college is a school where people are trained to become primary school teachers. It is generally a two
year program. There are no official statistics. The author worked in an after school center in Akka and interviews
with girls indicated it was their plan to enroll in the teachers college.
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the colonial period, the French established clear criteria for modernity. Through the introduction
of modern transportation, healthcare, agricultural techniques and schooling among many other
things, the French demonstrated their status as modern liberal individuals. As Chatterjee (1993)
notes, to advance and to produce is to be modern. Conversely, the mythical, degrading portrait
of the colonized becomes accepted as reality and they confirm the role assigned to them by the
colonizer (Memmi 1965). Through the denial of a history worthy of entextualization and
allowing space only for mimicry, the colonizer denies the colonized a place in modernity. In the
case of Morocco, the colonized were separated into the two distinct categories of Berbers and
Arabs where Arabs were consigned to the lower tiered category.

In the post-colonial period,

the role of the modern citizen was assumed by Arab nationalists and their monopolization of
modernity that was once the sole preserve of French colonialists has provided them the
hegemonic power to establish Morocco as an Arab-Islamic society regardless of the existence of
millions of Berber speakers.
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Conclusion
We wanted something thoroughly and uncompromisingly foreign—foreign from top to bottom—
foreign from center to circumference…nothing to remind us of any other people or any other
land under the sun…And lo! In Tangier we have found it.
--Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad
Following September 11th the Bush administration had the almost impossible task of
trying to explain and make sense of what happened for a nation struggling to understand the
whys and wherefores of one of the greatest catastrophes in the history of the United States.
However, instead of attempting to delve into the complex muddle that characterizes relations
between the West and the Muslim world (if such categories actually exist) Bush chose to cloak
himself in essentialist “us versus them” rhetoric and embark on a war that at several points
throughout the last several years has threatened to involve almost every Middle Eastern country.
Of course, choosing to launch an invasion of Afghanistan and, subsequently, Iraq, might have
been the easiest and safest choice to make politically because the narrative against violent
Muslims was already well established in the American psyche. In the United States it is almost
impossible not to think about the images of Arab violence that seem to permeate all levels of our
political and popular discourse: Munich; the marine barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1982; Pan
Am Flight 103; suicide bombers; the Lebanese Civil War; the U.S.S. Cole; the embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania; Al Qaeda; Osama bin Laden; the first and second Intifada;
Saddam Hussein; September 11th,. Furthermore, it answered the basic reflexive desire on the
part of Americans to strike back against those who had attacked us. A fact made more salient by
the actions of U.S. citizens to celebrate the recent death of Osama Bin Laden as if the United
States had just defeated the Soviet Union for the gold medal. The actual efficacy of Bush’s
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strategy has proven to be horribly wrong as evidenced by the fact that ten years and the loss of
hundreds of thousands of lives later, U.S. troops are still stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
One of the more subtle consequences of the Bush administration’s global war on terror
has been the triumph of what Edward Said 51 refers to as “territorial reductive polarizations”
(Said 1978, p. xxiii). Although the former President made some effort to distinguish between
what he defined as moderate and liberal Muslims and the fundamentalists the United States was
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact that the nineteen September 11th hijackers were Muslim
and from Saudi Arabia compelled many Americans to search for answers in the Koran. Olivier
Roy52 points out that after September 11th, English translations of the Koran became popular as
Americans felt compelled to discover what it was exactly about Muslims that would make them
believe it was somehow acceptable to kill thousands of innocent civilians (Roy 2004, p. 10).
There were also those who bypassed any effort toward cultural understanding entirely and
reacted to the crimes of September 11th by committing crimes of their own. According to FBI
statistics, hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims increased by over 1700 percent after
September 11th. 53 Congressman Rex Duncan, a Republican from Oklahoma, was one of 24
members of the Oklahoma state legislature that returned a gift copy of the Koran stating that
Islam’s holy book condoned murder. Taking this perspective to its extreme was Lieutenant
General William Boykin. In 2003, while serving as the Deputy Under-Secretary for Defense,
General Boykin equated Muslims with the devil when he suggested that terrorists targeted the
United States because it was a Christian nation and its enemy in the war on terror was Satan. 54
51

Before his death in 2003 Edward Said was a Literature Professor at Columbia University. He was most wellknown for his book Orientalism in which he strongly criticized the work of Middle Eastern scholars whose work
was strongly tied to imperialism and therefore suspect.
52
Roy is a French Professor who has studied Muslim culture and politics throughout Asia. He has been particularly
critical of the United States and its Middle East policy.
53
Taken from BBC News online, 19 November 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2488829.stm
54
Taken from BBC News online, 17 October 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3199212.stm
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The former President’s efforts to placate those who argued his administration was
inciting unnecessary aggression between Islam and the West were, aside from being
disingenuous, particularly inadequate. The conflict in the Middle East has never been about
Islam per se; particularly when considering there are Palestinian Christians who have chosen to
become suicide bombers. It is not a clash of civilizations as some might suggest 55 and is more
closely linked to ethnicity and the nature of Arab politics and history than anything particular
about the tenets of Islam. 56 Furthermore, as Olivier Roy sagely points out,
[t]he key question is not what the Koran says, but what Muslims think it says. Not
surprisingly they disagree, while all stressing that the Koran is unambiguous and clear
cut. The issue here is not Islam as a theological corpus, but the discourses and practices
of Muslims (Roy 2004, p. 10).
Roy’s argument is made more salient by the prominent lack of Middle Easterners taking part in
conversations about the Middle East, a criticism best articulated by Edward Said in his work
Orientalism (1979). According to Said, what it means to be “Oriental” has historically been
defined by Western intellectuals who often ignored the emotions, insights and history of the
actual people of the Orient (Said 1979, p. 8). 57
The Middle East--not to mention the “West” in its broadest sense--is an incredibly vast
collection of peoples, history, language and culture that cannot be easily cached under the label
Arab or Muslim or Oriental. Limiting the debate to a discussion of the values of the West versus
those of Islam is absurd because it also assumes that Western values are universally accepted.
Given the current political climate in the U.S., this is clearly not the case. However, this is the
constant refrain that permeates our public discourse. Remarkably, it has been over a century
55

The clash of civilizations is an idea first argued by Samuel P. Huntington who suggested cultural and religious
difference would be the primary source of conflict following the Cold War (Huntington 1993)
56
A majority of the world’s Muslims are not actually Arab although Islam has always been perceived as Arab. The
words have been interchangeable despite the existence of both Arab Christians and Arab Jews.
57
Said uses the term “Oriental” to refer to the people and culture of the Middle East and North Africa. In the United
States the term “Oriental” is generally used in reference to the Far Eastern countries of Japan, China and Korea.
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since Mark Twain wrote his chapter about the Moors and Morocco yet his understanding of the
Middle East and North Africa, in many ways, still illustrates the West’s understanding of Arabs
and Islam: foreign, different, and often violent. One of the reasons for this is because it is
intellectually easier to understand the events of September 11th and all that has proceeded from
them as part of the unchanging dichotomy that defines relations between the East and the West.
People often subscribe to an unchanging definition of culture and natural identity. Images of the
U.S. military valiantly defending freedom and liberty against Muslim terrorists fit this idealized
reality for most Americans almost perfectly until the evidence of torture surfaced and began to
cast doubt.
And yet cultures do not grow and evolve in a vacuum. They are constantly changing,
interacting and borrowing from one another; a fact brought home for me when I had the pleasure
of breaking fast during Ramadan at a McDonalds in the city of Marrakech, the old imperial
capital of Morocco; or, in the case of Berbers, the evolution of an international Berber rights
movement when, only sixty years ago, they did not view themselves as ethnically distinct from
their Arab neighbors; or the growth of Haratin corporate communities as a means of solving
Haratin specific problems where previously notions of Haratin-ness were not articulated.
Although the glaring obviousness of this reality is self-evident, there are many who still cling to
notions of ethnic absolutism or broad cultural generalizations. One need only look at the most
recent U.S. Presidential campaign in which John McCain and Sarah Palin suggested that certain
parts of the United States were more “American” than others. The primary reason for this is
simple fear. It is scary for many people to try and comprehend that their cultural reality is not
what they think. It is always shifting and evolving, hopefully for the better. It is this fear that
often prompts so-called fundamentalists of all religious persuasions to respond violently to those
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who challenge their religious dogma. Perhaps more importantly, is that the political reality of
the early twenty-first century has not given people much maneuvering room. It is extraordinarily
difficult to argue from the perspective of the perpetrators of September 11th, a fact emphasized
by President Bush when he argued that there was no room for neutrality in the war on terror. 58
Consequently, people are forced to choose: eastern or western, Muslim or non-Muslim,
American or anti-American, Israel or Palestine (Said 1979, p. 324). Nuance is not permitted.
When tourists come to Morocco they generally always make the obligatory trip into the
souk, the labyrinth of stalls and vendors selling everything from carpets and pottery to fruits and
vegetables. If you need it, chances are it is somewhere in the souk and tourists are looking for a
small piece of authentic Morocco to bring home with them. Indeed, the souk represents “real”
Morocco and people seek out the opportunity to sip a glass of mint tea and haggle over the
proper price of a hand-made carpet. Except, in many respects, the souk-s in cities such as
Marrakech are representative of the essentialist dichotomy epitomized by the policies of the
Bush administration and people always falls into their pre-assigned roles of tourist, tout and
merchant. This pantomime works in its own fashion as people walk away with what they are
looking for. Unfortunately, however, everyone is often wearing a metaphorical mask that
prevents any genuine exchange from taking place. The mass produced realities of culture that
represent individuals in the public sphere hide the day to day processes that produce and
reproduce culture in all of its many guises.
In the spring of 2002 I, along with several other Peace Corps volunteers in the desert
provinces of Tata, Ouarzazate and Zagora organized a men’s conference in the city of
Ouarzazate. The goal, stated broadly, was to bring villagers from the community level together
in order to share ideas and dialogue about problems being faced by people living in rural areas
58

Taken from CNN.com on 6 November 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/
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on the Saharan frontier. People living in these areas all faced similar issues related to
desertification, lack of health care, lack of education and lack of jobs. I asked Ahmed to attend
and share some of his insights and perhaps discuss some of the obstacles he had come across
while trying to develop his various community projects. While he agreed that he might be
presented with some new information that he might find useful he politely declined my
invitation. This was not the first time Ahmed refused to work collaboratively with people
outside of L’Kasbat. Earlier in my service Ahmed turned down even the mere suggestion of
working with other villages just within the oasis of Akka. It seemed like an obvious choice to
make in order to avoid making the same mistakes as others and to perhaps pool limited resources
if the projects were similar in nature, particularly given the fact that everyone in Akka was
impacted by the continued decline of the oasis.
From the limited perspective of the development worker I believe I was correct in
thinking it would be beneficial to organize a more collaborative oasis wide process for
addressing issues related to the possibility of environmental change. In addition, I had the fullfledged support--in the form of grant money--of my Moroccan supervisors in Rabat. What I did
not recognize was the cultural stratification which prevented broader collaboration from taking
place. The village of L’Kasbat was composed primarily of Haratin, while villages such as Ait
Rehal or Agadir Ouzrou were also populated by Berbers who still retained a stake in the social
hierarchy which limited the opportunities available to Haratin. Nor did I take into consideration
the opinions of their Arab neighbors who may or may not recognize Berbers as a distinct ethnic
group. And this is just within the confines of Akka; these variables become even more
complicated when Tamazight speaking Berbers and Arabic speaking Haratin from other parts of
Morocco are included in this equation. I do not want to suggest that the people of southern

77

Morocco are incapable of collectivity; the growing success of the February 20th movement
against the current incarnation of the makhzan proves otherwise. 59 However, the broader
discourse that locates both Moroccan Arabs and Moroccan Berbers as part of bigger transnational human-rights movements reveals only a very limited truth as it blurs the localized day to
day struggles of individuals like Ahmed and his family. Not only does it obscure the many ways
in which identity is articulated locally it also hides how the trans-national movements of people
and information impact and transform those articulations; in the case of Akka, it completely
eliminates the contributions of Black Moroccans and Africans more generally to Moroccan
society.
Yet, even when the contributions of Black Moroccans are foregrounded, their
marginalization cannot be explained away by simply overlaying the Western categories of race
onto the Moroccan landscape. Although the lower tiered status of Black Moroccans as Ismkhan
or Haratin seems to suggest that being Black carries a similar stigma as it does in the West, this
explanation proves unsatisfactory because unlike African descended communities in the diaspora
that utilize Blackness as the signifier of a shared belief in the commonalities of Western racial
oppression (Hanchard 2001), Black Moroccans, particularly in the case of the Haratin, have not
articulated a shared cultural space as either a means of defense against their marginalization or a
cultural space that is defined specifically as Black. Put simply, being Black in Morocco does not
carry with it the same racial and cultural ramifications that it does in the West and offers a
significant challenge to the politics of the African diaspora that often fall victim to the same type
of cultural insiderism that it was created to combat. As Gilroy (1993) notes “the idea of blacks
59

The February 20th Movement is the name given to the pro-democracy protestors in Morocco. The movement has
utilized the momentum created by the ousting of Hosni Mubarek in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia in order to bring
about significant democratic change in Morocco. So far, the King has publicly called for reform and the pro-reform
movement has specifically not targeted the monarch for criticism. Calls for demonstrations continue despite the fact
that they have been outlawed by authorities in Rabat.
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as a national group or proto-national group with its own hermetically enclosed culture plays a
key role…and the misplaced idea of a national interest gets invoked as a means to silence dissent
and censor political debate when the incoherence and inconsistencies of Africalogical discourse
are put on display”. All of this does not mean that race does not matter; in addition to Ahmed’s
reticence in participating in projects outside of his natal village, Moroccan historical discourse
continues to define Black Moroccans as being from outside of Morocco, specifically the space of
sub-Saharan Africa. However, what it does indicate to us is the need to expand our
understanding of Blackness and Africaness in order to incorporate Black identities that do not
explicitly align themselves with the space of the African continent. How do we define Blackness
and Africaness when it is outside of its traditional juxtaposition with Whiteness, Europe and the
West? What I hope I have demonstrated is that the physical genetic trait of “black” skin and all
that it represents culturally in the West loses some of its salience when placed into contexts like
Morocco and that the boundaries which we have historically used to define Blackness or
Whiteness become easily blurred forcing us to question whether or not these categories continue
to be anthropologically useful and if they were ever useful in the first place.
This brings us back to the beginning. What does the place of Akka tell us about
Morocco, about Africa and about global racial discourse more generally? Anthropologists, keenly
aware of the historical role our discipline has played in the marginalization of colonial peoples, are
reluctant to provide answers to such interminably vague questions and will generally opt to provide detail
of specific localities in lieu of providing broad generalizations and I believe I have adhered to that
tradition by making the answers to simple questions more difficult. However, despite the innate
reflexivity that comes from being trained as an anthropologist, I do not want to simply dismiss Western
conceptualizes of race because, as Ferguson (2006) argues, this principled stand by anthropologists
including myself does little to alter the image of “Africa” or “North Africa” in public discourse and only
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results in the marginalization of anthropology from policy discussions regarding the African continent
(Ferguson 2006). Gilroy again:

Commentators from all sides of political opinion…[fall] back on the idea of cultural
nationalism, on the overintegrated conceptions of culture which presents immutable,
ethnic differences as an absolute break in the histories and experiences of
“black” and “white” people (Gilroy 1993, p. 2).
Here, instead, I want to argue for Gilroy’s theory of hybridity or creolization in which all of the
“processes of cultural mutation and restless (dis)continuity that exceed racial discourse” (Gilroy
1993, p. 2) are accounted for and embodied in individuals such as Ahmed and the people of the
Akka oasis. Although Gilroy focuses his theory on the space of the “Black Atlantic,” his use of
the Atlantic as a heuristic model can be applied to the space of the Sahara desert and the
Mediterranean so that the terms African and Arab are no longer used as mutually exclusive
categories where Africa begins and ends at some ambiguous border in the desert. Interrogating
the place of Black Moroccans in this manner allows us the space needed to remap Morocco around the
idea of “unassimilated otherness” (Soja 1996, p. 116). By avoiding the established false dichotomies that
exist between Arab and African, North African and Africa and black and white, we are able to recognize
that Black Moroccans do not fit easily into any of these categorizations and instead are enmeshed in all of
them. The status that both Haratin and Ismkhan share at the margins of Moroccan society also allows
them a privileged position in terms of negotiating new and unique ways of being in the world. Although
unintentional, both of these communities reside firmly beyond the established boundaries and have the
opportunity to explode the traditional understanding of race and ethnicity in Morocco and elsewhere.
Indeed, this small place far away from the centers of power and activity provides us with the

opportunity to thoroughly examine the discursive practices we use to explain the world.
Furthermore, by revealing to us the dialogic nature of culture and identity more generally, Akka
demonstrates the limits to our current discourse on global race. Identities are always open to
contestation and there always exists the constant struggle to define and redefine how we live in
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the world. Most significantly, it also allows us to examine the processes which have produced
and reproduced the global discourse on race and provides a compelling counter-hegemonic narrative
against the continent’s colonial inheritance that places it on the outside of modernity looking in. Of
course, because landscapes are not ideologically neutral, the option of choosing marginality is fraught
with danger. People run the risk of simply reproducing the inside-outside dynamic. As noted by Foucault
(1977) it is very difficult to work outside of the categories produced by state power. It is only because of
their position in the margins that Black Moroccans have so far remained outside of the reach of
disciplinary power. And as history indicates this has not always been the case; for a brief moment in
time, the abd-al-Bukhari were the ultimate source of power in North and West Africa. However, the use
of racialized histories to understand the continent has not gone away and the opportunity to break down
those master categories should not be passed up.

Because the physical landscape is a significant partner in the unending processes of
identity and cultural formation I want to end with a note on the environment. In the 14th century,
Arab writer Ibn Khaldun completed his seminal work the Kitab al-Ibar (Universal History) that
included several volumes dedicated to the history of the Berbers and the Muslim dynasties in
North Africa (Davis 2007, p.55). Within his text, Khaldun provided an analysis of the
environmental impact created by the Arab invasion of the 12th century. According to most
colonial translations, Ibn Khaldun described the Arabic nomadic tribes of the Beni Hillal as a
“plague of locusts” that “committed all sorts of abuses, looted to enrich themselves…and
ravaged the whole county” (Davis 2007, p. 55). Although earlier colonial works had attributed
the decline of the North African environment to the Vandal hordes of the sixth century, Ibn
Khaldun’s description of the Arab invasion and its environmental impact became the dominant
narrative regarding the North African environment. Areas that had previously been sites of great
gardens and forests had been changed into desert by the nomadic practices of the Beni Hillal. Of
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course, Khaldun often referred to specific places, most in modern day Libya; however, colonial
writers generalized these descriptions to include all of North Africa in order to solidify the
narrative of how the Arabs, and to a lesser extent, the Berbers, had destroyed North Africa
(Davis 2007, p. 57).

Furthermore, despite the limited scope of Ibn Khaldun’s original

environmental analysis, his book became the foundation for a narrative of environmental
declension that continues to manifest itself in contemporary environmental assessments of
Morocco and Algeria in which local stakeholders continue to be excluded from the decision
making processes in Rabat.
This narrative is important because as Arundhati Roy (2009) points out, the battle for
land is at the heart of the development debate; however, unlike the Dalit-s or Muslims of India
who have their land taken from them because they live in places that contain wealth in the form
of minerals or timber, the development debate strikes a different tone in a place like Akka.
Indeed, the insidious lie of development proves to be quite flexible; on one hand it allows for the
theft of land in places like India in order to make way for vast hydroelectric projects, mining and
other massive infrastructure projects done in “the name of the poor, but really meant to service
the rising demands of the new aristocracy” (Roy 2009, p. 6). On the other hand, when the rural
poor participate in the global economy in their own very limited way they are admonished for
being poor environmental stewards when they are perceived as not using the land in an
environmentally sustainable way and are forced to atone for the realities of a global climate
change that they did not create as well as the failures of the nation state project by staying hidden
in their small villages far away from all of the simple “accoutrements” of modernity like proper
health care and schools. In Ahmed’s case, his attempt to expand farming in the oasis is seen as a
fool’s errand. Either way, the rural peasantry, whether they are Black or White, Berber or Arab
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speaker, remain on the outside of modernity looking in, dependent on the good graces of Roy’s
new aristocracy but ultimately being blamed for failing to succeed even though the deck is
stacked against them. It is against this backdrop that Ahmed, Omar and their fellow Akkawis
must contend in order to stake their claim for control of their future.
Going forward, the cultural and ecological landscape of Morocco continues to evolve.
The growth of the February 20th Movement and its strong push for democratic reform and the
transformation of Morocco into a constitutional monarchy similar to that of the United Kingdom
promises to bring about change that was unforeseen just six months ago. How this impacts rural
desert communities is, so far, unknown; however, the cultural complexities of Akka that I have
outlined indicate that the call for democratic change in the north will not allow for sides to be
chosen easily; indeed, the constant dialectic between the local, the national and the trans-national
make the future anything but predictable.
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